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The Future of Shareholder Democracy
LISA M. FAIRFAX*
In 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) considered, and
ultimately rejected, a rule that would have required corporations to include
shareholder-nominated candidates on the ballot. This Article seeks to ascertain the
impact of this rejection. On the one hand, the SEC's rejection appears to be a stunning
blow to the shareholders'rights campaign. This is because many shareholders' rights
advocates have long considered access to the corporate ballot as the "holy grail" of
their campaign for increased shareholder power. Such advocates believe that access
to the corporate ballot is critical to ensuring that shareholders can participate
legitimately in the corporate electoral process and thereby influence corporate affairs.
On the other hand, some corporate experts contend that the SEC' rejection should
not be viewed as a major setback. Such experts maintain that characterizing proxy
access as the sine qua non of shareholder influence fails to appreciate the significance
of recent developments, such as the success of majority voting and the adoption of the
e-proxy rules. Because these developments provide shareholders with alternative
methods for influencing corporate affairs, some have even argued that they may make
the issue ofproxy access moot. This Article reveals the fallacies of such an argument,
and hence the importance of the continued pursuit of proxy access. Indeed, after
carefully considering the impact of such developments, and critically examining the
probable impact ofproxy access on shareholders 'efforts to enhance their influence on
corporate governance, this Article concludes that although other devices may prove
useful, it is not likely that they will be as effective as proxy access in empowering
shareholders. In this respect, future shareholder democracy campaigns must continue
to focus on the historical battle for proxy access.
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INTRODUCTION
Shareholder activism recently has dominated the corporate governance landscape.
In particular, shareholders have waged an aggressive campaign to enhance their voting
power and authority within the corporation. Shareholder activists refer to their
campaign as one for "shareholder democracy" because it focuses on increasing the
efficacy of their voting right.I In the wake of corporate governance scandals and other
high-profile incidences of corporate malfeasance, the shareholder democracy campaign
is aimed at making corporate officers and directors more accountable, and hence less
likely to engage in misconduct. The campaign generally has achieved success, resulting
in changes that many believe will enhance shareholder power.
The one element missing from this success has been proxy access. 2 In every election
for directors, corporations prepare and distribute a proxy statement to shareholders,
which enables shareholders to vote on directorial candidates without being present at
the annual meeting. 3 Proxy access refers to shareholders' ability to nominate directorial
candidates of their choice to the corporation's proxy statement. Shareholder advocates
have long considered proxy access to be the "holy grail" of shareholder democracy.
4
Currently, only the names of management-supported candidates appear on the
corporation's proxy statement; corporations can exclude the names of candidates
supported by shareholders. 5 This exclusion means that the vast majority of directors
run unopposed. Because there is no election contest, this exclusion also means that the
results of director elections become an almost foregone conclusion. In light of this
phenomenon, shareholder advocates have been fighting to obtain proxy access for
1. See Thomas W. Joo, Comment: Corporate Governance and the "D-Word", 63 WASH.
&LEE L. REv. 1579, 1587 (2006); Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder
and Civic Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1389, 1390 (2006). But see Dalia Tsuk
Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1503, 1509-10 (2006) (explaining competing conception of shareholder democracy).
2. As this Article was going to press, Delaware's governor signed into law Delaware
House Bill No. 19, which amends the Delaware General Corporation Law by adding a new
section 112 providing, among other things, that a corporation may adopt (but is not required to
adopt) a bylaw allowing individuals nominated by stockholders to be included on the
corporation's proxy statement, and that the corporation may subject such inclusion to any lawful
procedures and conditions. See H.B. 19, 145th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009) This new
section makes clear that Delaware corporations can include a proxy access provision in their
bylaws, though it falls short of requiring proxy access. See id.
3. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2007). The
proxy statement is a statement containing information about the candidates to be voted on.
4. See Karey Wutkowski, SEC to Look Outside Ballot on Proxy Access, REuTERs, Jan. 4,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleld=USN 1741224720080104.
5. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2007)
(providing exclusions for shareholder proposals related to election of directors).
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more than halfa century. 6 Shareholder advocates believe that proxy access ensures that
shareholders have the ability to influence both corporate elections and day-to-day
affairs because it allows them to nominate and vote on candidates of their choice.
In late 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) considered, but then
ultimately rejected, proxy access for shareholders.7 Ths Article critically assesses the
impact of that rejection on shareholder democracy efforts. In fact, while shareholder
advocates view such rejection as a significant setback, some corporate scholars and
securities experts recently have argued that new initiatives may render proxy access a
moot issue. Given the importance shareholder advocates historically have placed on
proxy access, that argument, if valid, could dramatically alter future shareholder rights
efforts, enabling advocates to shift their focus and resources to other measures.
By evaluating the validity of this argument, this Article makes a number of critical
and novel contributions to the corporate governance literature as well as the
shareholder democracy campaign. In fact, this Article undertakes the first-ever
comprehensive evaluation of new shareholder empowerment measures and their
probable impact on enhancing shareholders' voting rights. After that evaluation, this
Article concludes that while such measures may augment shareholders' power, they
have flaws that make them less appealing than proxy access as a vehicle for
shareholder empowerment. This conclusion, therefore, discredits the assertion that such
new initiatives render proxy access moot. In so doing, this conclusion underscores the
importance of the continued fight for proxy access and provides important guidance to
shareholder advocates and the future of their shareholder rights efforts.
To be clear, the purpose of this Article is not to determine whether proxy access or
any other mechanism will achieve the ultimate &oal of enhancing corporate governance
or reducing instances of corporate misconduct. Instead, this Article seeks to determine
the most efficient and effective mechanism for enhancing shareholders' voting power.
Of course, it would be difficult to make such a determination without understanding the
purpose of shareholders' voting power. This Article contends that such purpose is
twofold: (1) to directly impact election outcomes, and (2) to indirectly influence
director behavior and hence corporate affairs by increasing the likelihood that directors
will engage with shareholders or otherwise incorporate shareholder concerns in their
decision making. This Article measures the effectiveness of all initiatives using both of
these metrics.
6. See infra Part II.A (describing historical efforts to gain access to the proxy statement).
7. See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release
No. 56,914, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,075, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450,70,453 (Dec.
11, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Final Shareholder Proposal Rule].
8. See, e.g., Wutkowski, supra note 4 (quoting former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt).
9. For a debate regarding the propriety of increasing shareholder power, see Stephen
Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1735,
1746 (2005) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for
Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REv. 601,624 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
Shareholder Voting Rights]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 HARV. L. REv. 833, 851 (2005). For a discussion of shareholders' historical role in
the corporation, see Mitchell, supra note 1. This Article does not seek to address the normative
question of whether increasing shareholder power is appropriate. Instead, this Article presumes
the propriety of that increase, and focuses on the best mechanism for achieving it.
2009] 1261
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the federal proxy system, and then
discusses the manner in which proxy access could increase shareholders' voting power.
This Part highlights why shareholder advocates believe that proxy access represents the
crux of any campaign for shareholder democracy. Part II discusses the historical and
current proposals for proxy access. This Part underscores the manner in which such
access has been rejected repeatedly. Part III assesses recent initiatives aimed at
improving shareholder power, and then critically examines whether those initiatives
can be viewed as viable alternatives to proxy access. This Part includes an evaluation
of majority voting, the abolition of staggered boards, proxy solicitation over the
Internet, and rules aimed at facilitating Internet-based communications among
shareholders as well as such communications between shareholders and managers. Part
III reveals that these initiatives represent important victories in the battle for
shareholder power, and thus augment shareholders' voting rights in meaningful ways.
Nevertheless, Part III concludes that these alternative initiatives fall short of providing
the type of power promised by proxy access. Hence, this Article contends that proxy
access should continue to be a core component of any future shareholders' rights
campaign.
I. PROXY ACCESS IN CONTEXT
A. The Proxy Access Hurdle
Shareholders' ability to elect directors has been characterized as one of
shareholders' most fundamental rights. 0 Because shareholders are the only group
empowered to vote, their voting right appears to reflect a critical source of power
within the corporation. Shareholders do have other avenues for influencing corporate
affairs, such as the ability to sue directors and officers. 1 However, courts have
emphasized the importance of shareholder voting.
12
10. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988); Bebchuk,
supra note 9, at 851; Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIs L.
REv. 605, 607 (2007).
11. Shareholders have the power to bring suit against directors for breaching their duty
owed to shareholders and the corporation. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT, ch. 7, subch. D
(2007) (describing derivative proceedings). However, there are significant procedural and
substantive hurdles to such suits that may impair the ability of that power to ensure managerial
accountability. See James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit
Litigation: A Critique ofZapata & the ALI Project, 1982 DuKE L.J. 959, 960; Daniel R. Fischel
& Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261, 286 (1986) (noting that the
overall effect of the legal rules regarding derivative suits is to deemphasize the role of liability
rules in confonming managerial behavior); Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise ofDerivative Suits: A
Commentary on the Paper ofProfessors Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 322, 339-40
(1986).
Shareholders also have the right to sell their shares. This so-called exit right has been viewed
by some as particularly important because it facilitates the market for corporate control by
enabling the displacement of poorly performing managers. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE
LAW 95 (1986). However, scholars have pointed out that the market for corporate control is
imperfect. See John Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical
1262 [Vol. 84:1259
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The right to vote in elections for directors represents one of the few, and perhaps
most significant, aspects of shareholders' voting rights. To be sure, shareholders'
voting rights are limited to approving certain fundamental transactions and voting to
elect directors. 13 By contrast, the vast majority of power is reserved to the board of
directors and corporate officers, collectively referred to as managers.' 4 Shareholders
neither can vote to elect or remove officers, 15 nor interfere in the ordinary business
decisions made by officers and directors. 16 Hence, shareholders' ability to elect
directors represents one of the primary ways in which shareholders can use the vote to
influence corporate affairs.
In fact, the voting right is designed to encourage managerial accountability to
shareholders. 17 While directors may be viewed as serving as agents for shareholders,
directors' interests may diverge from those of shareholders.18 The voting right aims to
align those interests. Thus, shareholders' ability to vote directors out of office or refuse
to elect them into office gives them direct control over poorly performing directors.
Moreover, the fact that shareholders have the power to replace directors indirectly
should induce directors to make decisions beneficial to shareholders.
19
Encompassed in the shareholders' voting right is their right to nominate candidates
for directors. Both directors and shareholders have the ability to nominate directorial
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLuM. L. REV. 1145,
1211-12 (1984) (noting that even when shareholders sell their shares and attendant voting
rights, management often remains in power after the takeover); James D. Cox, Compensation,
Deterrence and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 745, 752-53 (1984) (noting that while hostile takeovers may be effective for grossly
abusive management, derivative suits are the only real means to deal with single breaches of
fiduciary duty).
12. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 (noting that the shareholder voting right represents a
critical underpinning of corporate power); Stokes v. Cont'l Trust Co., 78 N.E. 1090, 1093 (N.Y.
1906) (noting that shareholders' power to vote is vital).
13. These fundamental transactions include approving amendments to the corporation's
charter and approving mergers, major asset sales, and dissolutions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, §§ 242 (amendments to certificate of incorporation), 251 (mergers), 271 (sale of assets),
275(c) (dissolutions) (2007); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 10.03(b) (articles of incorporation),
11.04(b) (mergers), 12.02(a) (disposition of assets), 14.02(e) (dissolution) (2007).
14. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2007) (requiring corporations to be managed by or
under the direction of the board of directors); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2007).
15. See McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 236 (N.Y. 1934) (prohibiting shareholders
from making agreements to elect officers and to interfere with discretion of board).
16. See id.
17. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 851.
18. Corporate scholars refer to this divergence as an agency problem and note that much of
corporate law is aimed at responding to this agency problem. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4-7 (1932); Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs,
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 309 (1976). But see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 290-91 (1999)
(noting that a director's role is more consistent with a trustee than that of an agent).
19. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 851.
20. See Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company
Act Release No. 27,913, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,467 (proposed July 27, 2007) [hereinafter
2007 Shareholder Proposals] (noting that a key right of shareholders is the right to appear at a
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candidates. For shareholders, the nomination right not only gives shareholders voice in
the selection process, but also ensures that directors selected by management have
challengers. In this regard, the nomination right bolsters the shareholders' voting right.
However, the widespread use of proxies impacts the nomination right. Shareholders
in public companies typically vote by proxy.21 A proxy refers to a shareholder's grant
of authority to a third party to cast a vote on the shareholder's behalf.22 Because of the
dispersed nature of public shareholders, not all shareholders can be present at the
shareholders' meeting, which makes it difficult to amass the quorum necessary to
conduct an election or other business. 23 Voting by proxy remedies this problem.
Because shareholders vote by proxy, however, corporations must solicit proxies in
advance of the shareholders' meeting. Federal law, known as the proxy rules, governs
the solicitation of proxies by public corporations. 24 These rules make it unlawful for
anyone to solicit a proxy without first filing a proxy statement with the SEC and
furnishing solicited shareholders with this proxy statement.25 A proxy statement is a
document containing information regarding the corporation and the matters on which
shareholders will vote.26 The statement must include a proxy card-a card on which
shareholders can record their votes.27 Thus, when the corporation solicits proxies, it
must prepare and distribute a proxy statement to all of its shareholders. In the case of
meetings for director elections, that statement must include information about the
candidates running for election. Such a proxy statement is sometimes referred to as the
"corporate ballot."28
The corporation is not required to include shareholder-nominated candidates for
directors on the corporate ballot. Because the proxy rules apply to all persons seeking
to solicit proxies, shareholders must comply with the rules. However, if shareholders
seek to solicit on behalf of nominees unsupported by management, shareholders cannot
rely on the corporation's proxy machinery. To be sure, Rule 14a-8 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), as amended, known as the shareholder
proposal rule, provides that corporations must afford shareholders who satisfy certain
conditions the ability to place various proposals on the corporation's proxy statement,
and a mechanism for allowing other shareholders to vote on such proposals.29
shareholder meeting and advance proposals on which to vote, including proposals for
nominating directorial candidates).
21. See CLARK, supra note 11, at 360.
22. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (2007) (authority to vote by proxy).
23. See Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
VAND. L. REv. 1129, 1135 (1993) (noting that the main reason corporations solicit proxies is to
satisfy state quorum rules).
24. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14A (2007).
25. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (2007).
When a proxy statement is made on behalf of an issuer in connection with the annual meeting
involving the election of directors, the proxy statement must also be accompanied or preceded
by an annual report. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (2007).
26. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2007).
27. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(2) (2007).
28. See Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REv.
37, 56 (1990); Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 856; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,688 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder
Franchise].
29. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007). Those
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However, Rule 14a-8 enables the corporation to exclude certain proposals from the
proxy statement, including any proposal relating to the election of a director.
30
According to the SEC, the purpose of the exclusion was to make clear that the
shareholder proposal rule was not the proper forum for waging election contests or
reform efforts. As a result of this exclusion, any shareholder seeking to put forth a
candidate for director not supported by management must wage a proxy contest by
preparing and distributing her own proxy statement.
Proxy contests are rare. On average, despite the existence of thousands of public
corporations, there are forty or fewer proxy contests each year. 32 This number drops
significantly outside of the hostile takeover contests. Hence, Professor Lucian Bebchuk
found that from 1996-2002 there were an average of only eleven proxy contests a year
unconnected to takeover fights.33 The lack of proxy contests reveals that shareholders
rarely rely on the proxy rules to nominate insurgent candidates.
Experts believe that this rarity stems from the costs associated with preparing and
delivering a proxy statement. The SEC has long recognized that for most shareholders,
"an election contest is not feasible because ofthe huge expenses involved. ' '34 Empirical
evidence confirms the significant expenses associated with preparing and distributing a
proxy statement. 35 Such expenses deter most shareholders from waging a proxy
campaign.
3 6
conditions encompass certain procedural requirements including that the shareholders must hold
at least one percent or $2000 in market value of the securities entitled to vote at the meeting and
must give notice of the proposal. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b). In addition, the company must
receive the proposal at its principal executive office no later than 120 calendar days before "the
date of the company's proxy statement released to shareholders in connection with the previous
year's annual meeting." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e)(2). Moreover, a shareholder may submit no
more than one proposal per shareholders' meeting. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c); Adam G.
Brimer, Getting Wired at the SEC: Reforming the Proxy Process to Account for New
Technologies, 58 ALA. L. REV. 179, 185-86 (2006); Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder
Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REv. 879, 886 (1994).
30. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8). There are a variety of bases upon which a company
may exclude a shareholder proposal, even if that proposal satisfies the procedural requirements
of Rule 14a-8. See generally Palmiter, supra note 29, at 890-92 (noting the most common bases
used to exclude shareholder proposals).
31. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 12,598,
Investment Company Act Release No. 9343, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,982, 29,982 (proposed July 7,
1976). Such exclusion also was designed to prevent the circumvention of disclosure
requirements required by other aspects of the proxy rules. See Shareholder Proposal Relating to
the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,161, Investment Company Act Release
No. 27,914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,488, 43,491 (proposed July 27, 2007); 2007 Shareholder
Proposals, supra note 20, at 43,469.
32. See Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, supra note 28, at 683 tbl. 1.
33. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 856.
34. See Reexamination of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder
Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange
Act Release No. 13,482, Investment Company Act Release No. 9740, 42 Fed. Reg. 23,901,
23,902 (May 11, 1977) [hereinafter Shareholder Participation].
35. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARv. L.
REv. 1489, 1499 (1970) (noting that 1969 estimates placed the cost of proxy fights at forty
thousand to one million dollars).
36. See Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, supra note 28, at 683; Elizabeth
2009] 1265
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Shareholders' inability to access the proxy statement also produces inequities.
Indeed, the current rules mean that incumbent directors or directors supported by
managers have their expenses borne by the corporation, while shareholders'
challengers must bear their own cost. 37 In this regard, the current regime advantages
managerial nominees.
Moreover, shareholders' inability to access the corporation's proxy statement
significantly diminishes their ability to nominate candidates for directors. Shareholders
do have the ability to recommend candidates to the corporation's nominating
committee. However, such ability rarely translates into management acceptance of such38
recommendations. If shareholders' recommendations are ignored or rejected, they
have very little recourse.39 Thus, shareholders can seek to nominate candidates from
the floor of the shareholders meeting.40 Yet because of the dispersed nature of
shareholders, the proxy solicitation process has supplanted the shareholder meeting as
the forum for nominating directorial candidates. 41 This means that nominating
candidates from the floor of the shareholders' meeting is ineffective because such
nominations occur after the vast majority of shareholders already have cast their vote
by proxy. Thus, if shareholders cannot nominate candidates via the proxy statement,
the nomination right is rendered relatively meaningless.
As a result, corporate elections reflect little more than a rubber stamp of
management's choice.42 Because shareholders do not have adequate means to advance
their own candidates for directors, most director nominees run for election without
challenge. When elections are uncontested, the election results become an almost
foregone conclusion. In this regard, the current rules transform the shareholder vote
into a pro forma exercise. As one expert noted, "to give any group exclusive access to
Cosenza, The Holy Grail of Corporate Governance Reform: Independence or Democracy?,
2007 BYU L. REv. 1, 43 (2007).
37. Shareholders are not entitled to reimbursement of their expenses associated with waging
proxy contests. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Frameworkfor Analyzing Legal
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1071, 1107-09 (1990). Instead, shareholders
may be reimbursed only if their costs are viewed as reasonable and the board approves the
reimbursement. By contrast, incumbents have a right to be reimbursed for their expenses related
to proxy contests so long as those expenses are reasonable. See id.
38. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter 2003 Proposed Nomination Rule] (noting that recommendations to nominating
committees are rarely effective).
39. See id.
40. See 2007 Shareholder Proposals, supra note 20, at 43,467; FRANKLIN BALoTrI & JESSE
FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 7.9 (4th ed.
2006).
41. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, Investment
Company Act Release No. 12,734, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420 (proposed Oct. 14, 1982) [hereinafter
1982 Proposed Shareholder Access Amendments]; Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 1505 (noting
that "the designation of candidates in the proxy materials is today's nomination").
42. See Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 1504 (noting that the inability to choose among various
candidates makes the process of voting pro forma).
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the corporate proxy materials for the purpose of designating its directorial candidates
would be virtually tantamount to giving that group the power to elect the board.'
43
The lack of shareholder access to the corporate ballot strips the voting right of much
of its ability to directly influence elections as well as its potential indirect power. This
is because directors are virtually guaranteed reelection, decreasing their need to be
concerned with repercussions for their failure to act in a manner that benefits
shareholders. 44 As a result, the shareholders' voting right becomes largely ineffective
as a means for ensuring managerial accountability.
4 5
B. The Promise of Proxy Access
1. Effectuating the Voting Right
Efforts to breathe life into shareholders' voting rights inevitably coalesce around
campaigns to obtain proxy access. Proxy access is ideal because it promises both direct
and indirect benefits. By removing the cost barrier associated with proxy solicitations,
proxy access directly influences election outcomes by ensuring that shareholders have
a realistic opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. 46 Moreover, proxy access
indirectly ensures that directors pay heed to shareholders' concerns or risk potential
removal.4 7 To be sure, shareholders' removal power must be credible or directors may
feel free to ignore shareholders' interests. However, proxy access poses a realistic
threat of removal because it ensures that shareholders have a realistic opportunity to
nominate and vote on insurgent directors. As a result, such access represents the kind
of threat most likely to encourage engagement between shareholders and corporate
managers. In this regard, proxy access indirectly augments shareholders' participatory
rights within the corporation, and hence appears to be an optimal mechanism for
enhancing shareholder power.
Proxy access also appears to represent an ideal mechanism for effectuating
shareholder power because it promotes participation by a broad spectrum of
shareholders. Because shareholders' ability to wage proxy contests currently depends
upon their ability to bear significant costs, only a limited number of shareholders can
effectively take advantage of the current proxy solicitation system.48 This is
problematic because it means that a small pool of shareholders may wield significant
influence over corporate affairs. By ensuring that shareholders have a cost-effective
means of nominating directorial candidates, proxy access enables participation by a
43. Id.
44. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 856.
45. See Blair & Stout, supra note 18, at 310 (noting that shareholders' voting rights give
them little or no control over directors).
46. Cf Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, supra note 28, at 688-90.
47. See Cosenza, supra note 36, at 42-43 (noting that allowing for proxy access improves
corporate monitoring).
48. See Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, supra note 28, at 687 (noting
small number of challengers); id. at 691 (noting costs of contests). Indeed, hedge funds have
increasingly wielded influence in proxy contests. See INSTrruTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., 2006
PosTsEAsON REPORT: SPOTLIGHT ON ExEcuTrvE PAY AND BoARD AccouNTmeABiLTY 2 (2006)
[hereinafter 2006 PROXY REPORT] (report on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
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broad range of shareholders. Then, too, most proposals enable shareholders to acquire
proxy access so long as they own a minimum level of stock. 49 Such proposals thus
ensure that a broad array of shareholders will have the ability not only to nominate
candidates to the corporate ballot, but also to influence the election process, and hence
corporate affairs.
At the same time, at least indirectly, proxy access encourages shareholders to
collaborate with one another, increasing the probability that elected directors will focus
on issues germane to the entire shareholder class. Indeed, one concern with the current
system is that if only one group (i.e., corporate managers) has the ability to nominate
candidates, then those candidates may feel beholden to that group. 5 Moreover, those
candidates may advance the interest of that group at the expense of advancing concerns
that benefit the corporation more generally. By opening up the ballot to more
shareholders, proxy access may alleviate this concern. Additionally, because
nominating shareholders would need to garner the support of other shareholders to get
their candidates elected, proxy access would require shareholders to collaborate with
one another. In fact, shareholders might need to join forces with one another to ensure
that they have the percentage of shares necessary to nominate a director candidate.
Because it depends upon these forms of coordinated efforts, proxy access encourages
shareholder cooperation, thereby increasing the likelihood that directors will represent
the interests of the entire shareholder group.
2. Roadblocks to Optimal Effectiveness
i. Collective Action Problems
To be sure, proxy access may not achieve its desired result because of collective
action problems associated with shareholders' exercise of the vote.5 1 The two most
notable collective action problems involve rational apathy and the free rider problem.
Many commentators describe shareholders as rationally apathetic.52 In their seminal
work, Berle and Means described the problem of rational apathy and its centrality to
corporate governance concerns.53 Rational apathy refers to the notion that the cost to
shareholders of informing themselves about a particular action and casting a vote in
49. See infra notes 92, 105 and accompanying text. For example, the two most recent
proposals for shareholder access to the ballot would provide access to any shareholder or group
of shareholders holding at least five percent of a company's securities for a period of one year.
See infra notes 105, 123. However, some advocates have criticized this threshold as too
onerous, particularly in light of the fact that the only requirement for submission of other
proposals is that shareholders own $2000 worth of securities. See RISKMETRICS GROUP, 2007
POsTsEAsON REPORT: A CLOSER LOOK AT ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENGAGEMENT 16 (2007)
[hereinafter 2007 PROXY REPORT]; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2007) (noting
shareholders must hold at least one percent or $2000 in market value of securities).
50. See Cosenza, supra note 36, at 42-43; Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 1504.
51. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520,526-
28 (1990) (noting the view that "[c]ollective action problems make shareholder passivity
inevitable").
52. See BERLE& MEANS, supra note 18, at 81; Black, supra note 51, at 527.
53. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 18, at 81.
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opposition to management exceeds the expected or actual benefit gained from such
voting. 54 Given this cost-benefit analysis, shareholders rationally decide not to vote or
at least not to vote in opposition to management. The free rider problem stems from
shareholders' realization that they can benefit by relying on the actions of other
shareholders, thereby undermining shareholders' incentive to take action on their
own.55 Shareholders' current failure to utilize the proxy machinery may stem from
rational apathy, the free rider problem, or both. If so, then affording shareholders'
proxy access may not serve to invigorate their voting rights.
Yet evidence suggests that these collective action problems can be overcome.
Indeed, in recent years shareholders have been increasingly active, waging a variety of
campaigns to increase their voting power within the corporation and influence
corporate policies on a range of issues. Moreover, their activism has yielded results.
56
Thus, as Part III will demonstrate, shareholders' voting campaigns, including those that
oppose management policies, have garnered strong shareholder support. Even
individual shareholders have engaged in activism with impressive results.
57
Additionally, investors have been more willing to withhold their support from
directors, particularly when directors ignore shareholders' request for action.
58
Moreover, despite the obstacles involved with waging a proxy battle, there have been
incidences in which shareholders not only have engaged in such battles, but also in
which those battles have culminated in shareholder nominated candidates defeating
those supported by management. 59 This discussion suggests that shareholders can and
will use their power, even under the current regime in which there exists obstacles to
such use. As a result, collective action concerns should not represent a significant
hurdle to shareholders' effective use of proxy access.
ii. Shareholder Competency
Shareholder competency concerns also may undermine the impact of proxy access.
Indeed, shareholders may believe that directors are better positioned to select
directorial nominees. By contrast, shareholders may be at an informational
disadvantage, and may lack the resources and expertise required to select candidates
for directors. Based on this assessment, proxy access may not yield its desired result
because shareholders may believe that granting their fellow shareholders a broad
nomination right is inappropriate and inefficient.
54. See CLARK, supra note 11, at 390-91; Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1277 (1983).
55. See CLARK, supra note 11, at 392-93; Black, supra note 51, at 528; Fischel, supra note
54, at 1277.
56. See 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 5-7.
57. See id. at 5.
58. See id. at 26.
59. See id. at 22. In 2007, thirty-four proxy fights went to vote, up from twenty-one contests
in 2006. At least one group of shareholders prevailed in their fight, securing three board seats.
See id.
60. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 877 (noting that the shareholders' tendency to vote with
management may result from rational deference to a party believed to be better informed).
61. Seeid.at880.
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To support this proposition, some may point to recent unsuccessful efforts to gain
shareholder support for proxy access bylaws. Indeed, in the 2007 proxy season,
shareholders voted on three proposals relating to proxy access. 62 The most high-profile
proposal was submitted at Hewlett-Packard Company (HP). After the submission, HP
sought to exclude the proposal. Thus, HP requested a "no-action" letter from the SEC's
staff, which is a letter indicating that the SEC would not take action against HP for its
exclusion decision. Because the SEC was actively considering the issue of proxy
access at that time, the SEC's staff refused to issue such a letter.63 Thereafter, HP
included the access proposal on its proxy statement. One would presume that the
attention HP garnered would have increased the likelihood of the proposal's success.
Instead, the proposal failed: it received forty-three percent of the shareholder vote.
64
The fact that it failed to receive the two-thirds vote necessary for passage may reflect
shareholders' lack of desire for such access. Then, too, another proxy access proposal
at UnitedHealth Group similarly failed to muster the requisite shareholder support.
65
These votes suggest that shareholder activists may be pressing for issues that other
shareholders do not support. The votes also suggest that shareholders may not deem it
appropriate to confer a proxy access privilege on other shareholders, undermining the
extent to which such access will be effective.
However, other evidence belies this suggestion. Of note, at least one bylaw access
proposal did receive majority support in 2007. 66 Moreover, shareholder activists
argued that the HP vote was a sign of success. 67 Indeed, the proposals at HP and
UnitedHealth Group received more than forty percent of the shareholder vote. 68 As
proxy experts note, such tallies reflect strong support for proxy access, particularly
given that they were first-time votes and most shareholder proposals tend to receive a
low level of support their first time on the ballot. 69 The strong percentage of
shareholders who approved of proxy access suggests that a significant portion of
shareholders do favor such access. It further suggests that shareholders feel
comfortable with their fellow shareholders' ability to exercise the nomination right
appropriately.
iii. Special Interest Shareholders
Many contend that proxy access may prove ineffective because it may confer power
on special interest shareholders who will advance concerns that are not beneficial to
the larger shareholder body or the corporation as a whole. Shareholders such as public
62. 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 16.
63. See Hewlett-Packard Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 224970, at *1 (Jan. 22,
2007) (noting that the SEC's staff expressed no view on whether HP can exclude the proposal).
64. See Tomoeh Murakami Tse, HP Investors Reject 'Proxy Access'; Proposal Would Have
Opened up Board-Nominating Process, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2007, at D02. The proposal
received thirty-nine percent of the vote, but was later revised to forty-three percent. Id.
65. The vote stemmed from a proposal submitted at UnitedHealth Group, which garnered
45.3% of the shareholder vote. 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 16.
66. See id. (describing vote at Cryo-Cell International, a small biotech firm).
67. See Tse, supra note 64.
68. See 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 16.
69. See Tse, supra note 64.
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pension funds and so-called social investors (shareholders that advance issues related
to social or environmental concerns) have been the primary users of the shareholder
proposal apparatus. Yet historical evidence suggests that these shareholders have a
tendency to advocate for narrow or personal issues.70 Given their history of activism, it
is probable that such shareholders will be the most likely to utilize proxy access. More
recently, hedge funds have been increasingly active in the corporate governance
landscape. 7 The prevailing understanding is that such funds tend to have short-term
horizons that may not align with the interests of other shareholders. 72 Yet their
resources enable them to wield considerable direct and indirect power over corporate
managers.73 In light of these shareholders, several scholars and commentators have
expressed concern that efforts to increase shareholder power will provide enhanced
leverage for investors concerned with advancing their own narrow agendas. 74 Even if
such shareholders do not gain direct support for their candidates, they could use proxy
• • • 75
access as a platform to indirectly pressure corporations, or engage in nuisance
campaigns. The potential that some shareholders will use proxy access to focus the
corporation on issues beyond those that impact all shareholders could undermine
significantly the effectiveness, and thus desirability, of proxy access.
However, while this potential represents a cause for concern, the extent of that
concern may have been exaggerated. First, it may not be accurate to characterize social
investors or even hedge funds as having interests necessarily inapposite with the larger
body of shareholders. In fact, some concerns raised by such investors generate
significant shareholder support.77 Thus, in the most recent proxy season some social
proposals fared as well as governance-related proposals.78 Then, too, recent evidence
suggests that some hedge funds engage in actions beneficial to all shareholders. 79 In
this respect, it cannot be automatically presumed that social investors or even hedge
70. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 9, at 1754; Roberta Romano, Public
Pension FundActivism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 795, 811-
12(1993).
71. See Frank S. Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial
Innovation 2, 20 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No.
06-21, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=931254.
72. See id. at 24. But Partnoy and Thomas have found that hedge funds engage in a variety
of activities, some of which are focused on more long-term strategies. Id.
73. See id. at 49.
74. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 9, at 1754; Romano, supra note 70, at
811-12 (noting the distinction between public and private funds and the pressure public funds
face to focus on local and/or social issues); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning
Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1018,
1022-23 (1998).
75. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 9, at 1754; Bebchuk, supra note 9, at
878.
76. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 879-80.
77. See 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 20,31 (pinpointing shareholder proposals
receiving strong, and in some cases, majority support).
78. See id. at 44.
79. See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 71, at 46 (noting that some forms of hedge fund
activism, particularly those that focused on targeting corporate governance procedures, may be
beneficial to the broader shareholder class).
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funds will introduce candidates with narrow views or otherwise engage in campaigns
that do not benefit all shareholders.
Second, by providing all shareholders with a more cost-effective means of
exercising their voices, proxy access may undercut the influence of groups with greater
resources. Indeed, one reason for the success of hedge funds' activism is their greater
resources. Yet, proxy access could undermine their influence by minimizing the
importance of those resources in determining shareholders' ability to wage proxy
contests. Then, too, shareholders have rebuffed the efforts of hedge funds and other
investors when such investors have been perceived as advancing interests inconsistent
with those of the broader shareholder class.80 For example, shareholders have voted
down hedge fund buyouts, demonstrating a willingness to put the interests of the
corporate enterprise and other constituents above their own short-term profit-making• 81
interests. These actions suggest that increasing shareholder power may enable more
shareholders to take an active role in governance matters and better fend offthose who
would harm the interests of the corporation as a whole.
Third, the fact that candidates need majority support reduces the extent to which
shareholders with special interests can hijack the election process.82 Simultaneously, it
increases the possibility that shareholders will put forth candidates with broad appeal.
The evidence on current shareholder activism supports this possibility. Thus, the last
few years of proxy data reveal increased coordination among various shareholder83
groups. This suggests that shareholders' increased power also has increased their
incentive to work together. The proxy data therefore support the notion that
shareholders will use proxy access to advance candidates that appeal to a broad group
of shareholders, thereby undermining the contention that such access will result in
shareholders imposing candidates inclined to advance only narrow or specialized
issues.
3. Concluding Assessments
As this discussion reveals, while there may exist drawbacks to proxy access, on the
whole, it appears to live up to the promise of ensuring that shareholders' voting rights
are meaningful. Moreover, it appears to strengthen the voting rights of a broad cross-
section of shareholders, while decreasing the likelihood that a few shareholders will
improperly influence either the election process or corporate affairs more generally. In
this respect, shareholder activists' focus on proxy access seems both legitimate and
understandable.
80. See id. at 21.
81. See id.
82. See Partnoy& Thomas, supra note 71, at 14-15; Schwab & Thomas, supra note 74, at
1035-36, 1082-83 (noting that shareholder proposals cannot succeed without the support of
other shareholders, and that such support will not be forthcoming unless such proposals relate to
issues that resonate with the majority of shareholders).
83. See INSTrrTlONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., 2005 POSTSEAsON REPORT: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AT A CROSSROADS 10, 41 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 PROXY REPORT];
INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., 2004 POsTsEAsoN REPORT: ANEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
WoRLD: FROM CONFRONTATION TO CONsTRucTvE DIALOGUE 5, 28 (2004) [hereinafter 2004
PROXY REPORT].
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Of course, proxy access represents a limited right. Such access merely grants
shareholders the power to replace incumbent directors or elect different ones.
However, it does not provide shareholders with the power to initiate corporate policies,
or as Bebchuk describes it, set the "rules-of-the-game." 84 Hence, even with proxy
access, directors and officers will continue to have the authority to manage corporate
affairs without significant shareholder interference. From that perspective, proxy
access does not dramatically alter the balance of power within the corporation.
5
However, such alternation is not the goal of proxy access. Instead, proxy access is
aimed at ensuring that shareholders can more effectively wield their voting power
within the existing framework. Currently, the cost associated with conducting proxy
contests has unnecessarily burdened the voting right. The goal of proxy access is to
remove that burden, and thus restore voting rights to its proper role in the corporate
governance landscape.
II. TiE PROXY WARS
A. Historical Proxy Access Battles
The SEC first considered granting shareholders access to the corporate ballot in
1942. In that year, the SEC proposed a rule that would have required corporations to
include on their proxy statements shareholder-nominated candidates for director.
86
After receiving an overwhelming amount of criticism regarding the rule, the SEC
declined to implement it.
87
In 1977, the SEC revisited the question of proxy access in the context of its more
comprehensive examination of election procedures and corporate governance. 88 Thus,
in April 1977, the SEC invited comments regarding whether the proxy rules should be
altered to allow shareholders access to the corporate ballot for purposes ofnominating
candidates of their choice. 89 As a result of this process, in 1982, the SEC put forth
three proposals relating to shareholders' access to the corporation's proxy statement.
90
Proposal I retained the existing framework, but added additional procedural rules while
84. Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 856-57. However, proxy access does promise indirect
benefits that may influence corporate decision making. See id. at 878.
85. But see Bainbridge, Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 9, at 603-06 (noting that
any increase in managerial accountability necessarily limits managerial power).
86. Securities Act Release No. 2887, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, Investment
Company Act Release No. 417, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,655, 10,656 (Dec. 18, 1942); see also Barnard,
supra note 28, at 54 n. 102. The SEC also proposed a rule allowing shareholders to include a
100-word statement on the proxy statement opposing any management proposal-a predecessor
to Rule 14a-8. See Securities Act Release No. 2887, 7 Fed. Reg. at 10,656; Barnard, supra note
28, at 47.
87. See Barnard, supra note 28, at 54; Fisch, supra note 23, at 1163.
88. See Shareholder Participation, supra note 34, at 23,901.
89. See id. at 23,903. The question submitted for consideration was the following: "Should
shareholders have access to management's proxy soliciting materials for the purpose of
nominating persons of their choice to serve on the board of directors?" Id. The Release then
posed questions about the process for such nomination. Id.
90. See 1982 Proposed Shareholder Access Amendments, supra note 41, at 47,420.
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providing interpretive guidance regarding some substantive rules. 91 One of the
principal changes embodied in Proposal I was a revision requiring shareholders to hold
a minimum number of shares for a period of at least one year in order to submit a
shareholder proposal. 92 At the time, such restrictions did not exist.
Proposal II would have enabled a corporation, with the approval of its shareholders,
to adopt its own procedures for shareholders to access the ballot. Thus, Proposal II
essentially allowed corporations to opt-out of the federal proxy rules regarding
proposals,93 giving shareholders and corporations the flexibility to determine their own
plan for the shareholder proposal process.94 Proposal III would have eliminated the
corporation's ability to exclude shareholder proposals from the ballot, other than those
that would be improper under state law and those impacting director elections.
95
Proposal III would be subject to a numerical limit on the aggregate number of
proposals required to be included in the corporate proxy statement.
9
Ultimately, the SEC declined to embrace the proposal extending proxy access to
shareholders. Of the three proposals, Proposal II would have granted some form of
proxy access because it enabled shareholders and corporations the flexibility to
establish their own procedures for accessing the ballot. Yet Proposal II prompted
significant criticism.97 Commentators complained that the discretion it afforded
corporations and shareholders would lead to a lack of uniformity among corporations
prompting potential confusion and increased litigation based on that confusion.
9Q
Hence, the SEC rejected Proposal II. Instead, the SEC adopted Proposal I, which
basically reaffirmed the status quo of nonaccess. 99
In 1992, the SEC engaged in a comprehensive review of the proxy rules. 0°
However, while the SEC implemented a variety of amendments to the federal proxy
rules, the SEC did not institute any provisions providing proxy access. 01
91. Seeid. at47,421.
92. See id. Shareholders would have to be a record or beneficial holder of at least one
percent or $1000 in market value of an issuer's securities. Id.
93. See id. at 47,422.
94. The SEC expected that any rules for such a plan would establish minimum limits on
eligibility and the basis for exclusion of any shareholder proposals. See id.
95. See id. In this regard, Proposal III would have been self-executing, thereby eliminating
much of the SEC staff's participation in the shareholder proposal process. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to
Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 20,091,48 Fed. Reg. 38,218, 38,218
(Aug. 16, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 Final Rule] (Final Rule).
98. See id.
99. See id. In fact, a substantial majority of commentators favored Proposal I. Id.
Proponents believed that ensuring that shareholders had an economic stake in the company
would curtail abuses of the rule. Id. at 38,219. Interestingly, the adoption ofProposal I triggered
sharp criticism from Commissioner Longstreth who believed that the additional procedural rules
encompassed in the new amendments "[tilt] significantly and unnecessarily against shareholders
seeking access to the proxy machinery." Id. at 38,223. Commissioner Longstreth would have
simply retained Rule 14a-8 in its then existing form. Id.
100. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
31,326, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,277 (Oct. 16,
1992) (noting extensive three-year examination of proxy voting rules and procedures).
101. See Fisch, supra note 23, at 1170.
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B. Recent Skirmishes
The corporate governance scandals of 2002 spurred renewed consideration ofproxy
access. In early 2003, the SEC directed its staffto conduct a study of proxy regulations
with an eye towards improving corporate democracy. 102 The study revealed several
areas of concern, including once again highlighting the inequities generated by
shareholders' inability to nominate their own candidates on the corporate ballot.
10 3
As a result, in 2003 the SEC proposed Rule 14a- 11, which would have granted
shareholders proxy access under certain circumstances. 104 Under the proposed rule,
upon one of two triggering events, a corporation would have been required to include a
shareholder-nominated candidate on its proxy statement so long as the shareholder
making such a nomination held at least five percent of the voting stock for a period of
two years.10 5 Under the first triggering event, shareholders would have the right to
access the corporate ballot if a resolution requesting the corporation to adopt majority
voting had received more than fifty percent of the shareholder vote, and the
corporation had failed to implement majority voting within 120 days of such vote. 10 6
The second triggering event occurred if shareholders had withheld at least thirty-five
percent of their votes from one or more director candidates in a previous director
• 107
election. Rule 14a-1 1 also amended Rule 14a-8 to make clear that proxy access
proposals regarding director election procedures could not be excluded under Rule
14a-8.1
0 8
The opposition to Rule 14a- I1 eventually led to its demise. Indeed, after receiving
comments on the rule, the SEC made no effort to adopt it. By 2005, the SEC's staff
interpreted the inaction as a signal that the SEC had abandoned its commitment to
providing proxy access.109
The Second Circuit revived the issue in American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) v. American International Group, Inc. (AIG). 110 In
that case, AFSCME, an employee pension plan and shareholder of AIG, sought to
compel AIG to include a shareholder proposal in its proxy statement related to a bylaw
102. See 2003 Proposed Nomination Rule, supra note 38, at 60,784; Press Release, U.S.
Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Commission to Review Current Proxy Rules and Regulations
to Improve Corporate Democracy, 2003-46 (Apr. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-46.htm.
103. See 2003 Proposed Nomination Rule, supra note 38, at 60,784.
104. Seeid.
105. See id. at 60,794.
106. See id at 60,789-90. The majority vote resolution could be submitted only by a
shareholder holding at least one percent of a company's outstanding shares for a year. Id. at
60,789.
107. Id, at 60,789.
108. Id.
109. Thus, in a series of "no-action" letters, the SEC's staff took the position that
shareholder proposals based on Rule 14a- 11 could be excluded from the corporation's proxy
statement because, given the passage of time without SEC action, the adoption of such proposal
appeared to reflect a position that the SEC no longer supported. See, e.g., Halliburton Co., SEC
No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 283290, at *1 (Feb. 7, 2005); Qwest Communications Int'l Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 283288, at *1 (Feb. 7, 2005).
110. 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006).
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provision permitting shareholder-nominated candidates to be included on the corporate
ballot under certain circumstances.1 I The SEC's stafftook the position that AIG could
exclude the proposal from its proxy statement. 12 Indeed, for almost two decades, the
SEC had interpreted Rule 14a-8 to mean that shareholder proposals on election
procedures could be excluded based on the provision allowing exclusion of proposals
related to elections. 113 However, the Second Circuit argued that such a position was in
conflict with the SEC's earlier interpretations of the proxy rules." 4 According to the
Second Circuit, after the passage of Rule 14a-8, the SEC had neither clearly interpreted
nor applied the proxy rules as excluding proposals on election procedures.
115
Therefore, the SEC's more recent interpretation of the rules reflected a change, and a
change that was made without any explanation. 116 The Second Circuit reasoned that the
SEC's earlier interpretation should be given greater weight because it was pronounced
at the time that the exclusion was implemented.' 17 Based on that interpretation, the
Second Circuit held that shareholder proposals encompassing procedures for proxy
access could not be excluded because they did not relate to an election within the
meaning of Rule 14a-8. 1 The Second Circuit then suggested that the SEC clarify its
position on shareholder proposals adopting election procedures."1
9
120
Eventually, the SEC responded. In July of 2007, the SEC invited comments on
two conflicting proxy access proposals.121 One proposal would have amended Rule
14a-8 to permit inclusion of shareholder proposals in the company's proxy materials
relating to bylaws mandating procedures for shareholders to nominate candidates to the
board.122 Such bylaw proposals could be included so long as the shareholder (or a
111. See id. at 123. The proposal provided that shareholder nominees could be included on
the corporate ballot so long as the shareholder making such a nomination held three percent of
the outstanding shares for at least a year. Id. at 124 n.3.
112. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 372266, at *1 (Feb. 14,2005).
113. See 2007 Final Shareholder Proposal Rule, supra note 7, at 70,453;AFSCME, 462 F.2d
at 123.
114. AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 126; see also 2007 Final Shareholder Proposal Rule, supra note
7, at 70,451 (noting that the SEC's position did not allow exclusions based on the election
exclusion).
115. SeeAFSCME,462F.3dat 123.
116. Id. at 129.
117. Seeid.
118. See id. at 129-30. This ruling occurred because the Second Circuit interpreted the rule
to prohibit only those proposals that would result in an immediate election contest, and bylaws
focused on procedures did not create such immediate election battles.
119. See id. at 131 (noting that the SEC "[could] certainly change its interpretation of the
election exclusion").
120. The SEC held a series of roundtables in May 2007 on the issue of shareholder rights
more generally. See generally U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Spotlight on: Roundtable
Discussions Regarding the Proxy Process,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess.htm.
121. The SEC also sought comments on electronic shareholder forums and whether
corporations or shareholders should have the ability to propose and adopt bylaw procedures for
including nonbinding shareholder proposals in the corporation's proxy materials. 2007
Shareholder Proposals, supra note 20, at 43,469.
122. Id.
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group of shareholders) submitting the proposal had held more than five percent of the
company's securities for at least one year. The amended rule also would require that
any submitted shareholder proposal be consistent with state law as well as the
company's existing bylaws and charter. 24 Hence, the proposal gave shareholders the
ability to craft their own rule rather than mandate a specific rule. 125 The second
proposal would have amended Rule 14a-8 to make clear that corporations could
exclude from their proxy statement any proposal for a bylaw aimed at adopting
procedures for allowing shareholder access to the ballot.
126
Consistent with its prior record, the SEC ultimately embraced the proposal denying
shareholders access to the corporate ballot. Disagreeing with the Second Circuit, the
SEC argued that the inclusion of shareholder nominees for director in a company's
proxy materials would create a contested election. 127 However, the proxy rules contain
a provision aimed at regulating proxy contests and ensuring adequate disclosure in
connection with such contests. In the SEC's view, if the election exclusion were not
available for bylaw proposals establishing a process for the inclusion of shareholder
nominated candidates, shareholders would be able to circumvent the proxy rules and
wage an election contest without providing important disclosures.'29 In this respect, the
SEC insisted that Rule 14a-8 was not the proper vehicle to wage a proxy contest, and
thus not the proper forum for allowing shareholder proposals concerning access to the
ballot. 130 Thus, the SEC adopted the rule permitting exclusion of bylaw provisions that
would establish procedures for conducting an election. Although some
123. See id. The one-year holding period would apply to each member of the shareholder
group. Id. In addition, any soliciting shareholder must be eligible to file and file a Schedule
13G. Id. Schedule 13G is available only for people who have acquired securities without the
intention of seeking a change of control of the issuer. See id.
124. See id. at 43,470.
125. See id. Indeed, shareholders could even determine the minimum level of share
ownership necessary to have such nominations included in the corporation's proxy statement.
See id.
126. See Shareholder Proposal Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release
No. 56,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,488, 43,488-89
(proposed July 27, 2007). Thus, the proposal would change the existing language which enables
the corporation to exclude a proposal if the proposal "relates to an election for membership on
the company's board of directors or analogous governing body." Id. at 43,490. In its place, the
new rule would provide for exclusion "[i]f the proposal relates to a nomination or an election for
membership on the company's board of directors or analogous governing body or a procedure
for such nomination or election." Id. at 43,496.
127. See 2007 Final Shareholder Proposal Rule, supra note 7, at 70,450.
128. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-12, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-12 (2007).
129. See 2007 Final Shareholder Proposal Rule, supra note 7, at 70,450. To be sure, the
proposed rule allowing shareholder access included additional disclosure requirements under
Schedule 13G and new Item 24 and Item 25. 2007 Shareholder Proposals, supra note 20, at
43,471-73.
130. See 2007 Final Shareholder Proposal Rule, supra note 7, at 70,451.
131. See id. at 70,452. In addition to excluding such bylaw provisions, the rule also excluded
any provisions that would have the impact of disqualifying a nominee, removing a director prior
to the end of her term, or questioning a director's competence or business judgment. See id. at
70,454. Importantly, however, the SEC made clear that corporations cannot use the rule to
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commentators urged the SEC to wait and assess the impact of AFSCME before
adopting any rule impacting proxy access, 132 the SEC believed it was important to
adopt a rule to provide clarity for corporations and shareholders during the upcoming
proxy season. 33 Hence, the new rule went into effect almost immediately.
134
C. The RoadAhead
Despite its rejection, some members of the SEC have indicated a willingness to
reopen the proxy access issue. Thus, Chairman Cox insisted that he intended to make
proxy access part of the SEC's agenda for 2008.135 And in a recent speech, Cox stated
that the SEC's 2008 agenda would continue to focus on ensuring that shareholders can
more effectively utilize their voting power.136
However, others have suggested that recent developments may lessen the need for
proxy access. Indeed, former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt argued that some recent
initiatives may make the issue of proxy access moot.
13
Given the difficulties they have encountered, shareholder advocates should
experience relief if other measures undercut the need for proxy access. To be sure,
commentators' rejection of proxy access proposals sometimes turns on the form of the
proposed rule. 13 In this respect, such rejection is not necessarily a rejection of proxy
access itself. However, even that rejection highlights the difficulty with drafting an
acceptable access rule. Moreover, many in the business community consistently have'39
opposed any efforts to grant proxy access. Some fear that granting shareholders an
access right would be too costly because it would transform every election contest into
a proxy fight. Shareholder advocates not only question the extent of such costs, but
also contend that such cost concerns may not be a legitimate reason to reject proxy
access given the importance of such access to effectuating shareholders' voting power.
Still others fear that nuisance proposals and special interest shareholders will
undermine the effectiveness of proxy access. Opponents also fear that such proposals
exclude proposals relating to voting procedures, such as those requiring majority voting in the
election of directors. See id.
132. See id. at 70,453.
133. See id. at 70,452 (noting that inaction by the SEC would promote uncertainty,
escalating the confusion created by the AFSCME decision and effectively requiring shareholders
and courts to litigate the meaning of the proxy rules).
134. See id. at 70,450. The new rules took effect January 10, 2008.
135. See Wutkowski, supra note 4.
136. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, The SEC
Agenda for 2008: Remarks to the 'SEC Speaks in 2008' Program of the Practising Law Institute
(Feb. 8. 2008), available at
http://www.knowledgemosaic.com/Gateway/Rules/SP.spch02O8O8cc.020808.htm. In his speech,
Cox stated that the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance would "continue to pursue our
fundamental objective of making the federally-regulated proxy system fit better with the state-
authorized rights of shareholders to determine the directors of the companies they own." Id. To
be sure, such a statement is not necessarily a promise to seek some form of proxy access.
However, it may ensure that such access will remain part of the governance conversation.
137. See Wutkowski, supra note 4.
138. See 1983 Final Rule, supra note 97, at 38,218 n.3 (noting that some commentators
supported the concepts underlying Proposal II, but did not support the proposal itself).
139. See id. at 38,218 n.2 (noting the large number of comments opposing proxy access).
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may dissuade management-supported candidates from participating in corporate
elections. 14 These kinds of fears apparently have prompted the SEC to reject proxy
access. The past and most recent history of rejection reveals that the fight for proxy
access has been, and will continue to be, an uphill struggle. Hence, if shareholder
activists can reach their goal of empowering shareholders through other mechanisms,
then focusing on such mechanisms may be a more optimal strategy. The next section
seeks to evaluate the viability of this alternate strategy.
III. ALTERNATIVE CAMPAIGNS FOR SHAREHOLDER POWER
This Part explores four recent measures aimed at increasing shareholder power.
After pinpointing the benefits and drawbacks of those measures in Parts III.A-D, Part
III.E more deeply probes their impact on shareholders' ability to indirectly impact
election outcomes and corporate affairs.
A. E-Proxy
1. The "Notice and Access" Regime
At the end of 2006, the SEC issued new rules aimed at facilitating the use of the
Internet in proxy solicitations. 41 The Internet solicitation rules, or the so-called e-
proxy rules, went into effect July 1, 2007.142 The rules, referred to as the "notice and
access" model, allow both companies and soliciting shareholders to disseminate proxy
materials by providing notice to shareholders regarding availability ofproxy materials
and posting such materials on a generally accessible Web site.14 The notice can be
sent electronically to any shareholder that previously has consented to electronic
140. See William J. Feis, Is Shareholder Democracy Attainable?, 31 Bus. LAw. 621, 640
(1976).
141. See Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 55,146,
Investment Company Act Release No. 27,671, 72 Fed. Reg. 4148, 4148-88 (Jan. 29, 2007)
[hereinafter Final E-proxy Rule]. These rules mark the first time the SEC has sought to rely on
the Internet to provide an alternative method for proxy solicitation. See Brimer, supra note 29,
at 191. In the past, the SEC has provided interpretive guidance regarding the manner in which
electronic measures may satisfy the existing proxy delivery requirements. Thus, the SEC
published an interpretive release in October 1995 focusing on the use of electronic media to
communicate with investors. See Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities Act
Release No. 7233, Exchange Act Release No. 36,345, Investment Company Act Release No.
21,399, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,458 (Oct. 13, 1995). In April 2000, the SEC published another
interpretive release. See Use of Electronic Media, Securities Act Release No. 7856, Exchange
Act Release No. 42,728, Investment Company Act 24,426,65 Fed. Reg. 25,843 (May 4,2000).
See Brimer, supra note 29, at 186-90 (describing the SEC's historical guidance on electronic
methods of communication). In contrast, these new rules provide shareholders with an
alternative method of delivering proxy materials.
142. See Final E-proxy Rule, supra note 141, at 4148.
143. See Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 52,926,
Investment Company Act Release No. 27,182, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,598 (proposed Dec. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter Proposed E-proxy Rule].
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disseminations. 144 Under the rules, the soliciting party must provide a paper copy of
the solicitation materials to any shareholder who requests them at no charge. The
rules allow a shareholder to make a permanent request to receive paper or e-mail
copies of proxy materials.146 Then, too, a soliciting shareholder, but not an issuer, may
limit her solicitation to shareholders who have previously agreed not to request a paper
copy of the soliciting materials.147 Such a limitation does not prevent any solicited
shareholder from requesting a paper copy.148
2. Impact on Shareholder Power
i. The Cost Savings Conundrum
The potential cost savings afforded under the e-proxy rules makes it perhaps one of
the most promising alternatives to proxy access. The consensus view is that cost is the
principal impediment to waging proxy contests. 149 The SEC estimated that the printing
and mailing costs to issuers and other soliciting persons associated with soliciting
proxies was approximately $962.4 million in 2006.150 The e-proxy rules are aimed
specifically at reducing those kinds of costs.151 In so doing, the e-proxy rules should
144. See Final E-proxy Rule, supra note 141, at 4151 n.49. In addition, the notice must be
sent forty calendar days before the shareholder meeting date. See id. at 4150. The notice must
include such information as a statement of the matters to be voted on and information regarding
how to request a paper copy of the proxy materials. See id. at 4151-52. To mitigate concerns
that shareholders would vote prior to reviewing their proxy statement, a proxy card cannot be
sent along with the notice. See id. at 4150. Instead, the proxy card must be posted on the Web
site containing the proxy statement, and such site must provide a mechanism for executing the
proxy card electronically. See id. at 4153. However, soliciting shareholders and issuers have the
option of sending a proxy card ten days after they have distributed notice. See id.
145. Seeid. at4154.
146. See id. at 4149, 4154. The request, however, can be revoked. See id. at 4154 n.86.
147. Seeid. at4158.
148. The proposed rules included a provision allowing soliciting shareholders, but not the
issuer, to engage in a conditional solicitation by conditioning proxy solicitation on a solicited
shareholder's agreement to rely solely on the Internet to access proxy materials. Such a
conditional solicitation would mean that soliciting shareholders would not have to furnish paper
copies to those who requested them. However, the final rules rejected such conditional
solicitations, and hence a soliciting shareholder must send a paper copy to any shareholder to
whom notice was sent. See id. at 4150, 4158.
149. See id. at 4164 (noting that "undertaking a proxy contest is often a very costly
endeavor"); see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.
150. See Final E-proxy Rule, supra note 141, at 4162. Issuers and others spent $481.2
million on printing and mailing costs in 2006. Automated Data Processing (ADP) mails proxy
materials for beneficial owners, and in 2005, ADP was responsible for mailing about fifty
percent of proxy materials. See id ADP's costs together with issuers and others amounted to
$962.4 million. See id.
151. In the adopting release, the SEC noted that the new rules were designed to give
soliciting shareholders "an alternative method to furnish proxy materials that may have the
effect of reducing the cost of engaging in a proxy contest." See Proposed E-proxy Rule, supra
note 143, at 74,599. Elsewhere in the release, the SEC pointed out that the rules could
"significantly decrease the cost of proxy solicitation, given the potential decrease in printing and
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enhance significantly shareholders' use of the proxy machinery. 152 Therefore, the rules
should reinvigorate shareholders' nomination and voting rights.
If this occurs, then the e-proxy rules should facilitate both indirect and direct
benefits for shareholders. By removing the cost barrier to nomination, the e-proxy rules
increase shareholders' ability to elect candidates of their choice. The fact that the e-
proxy rules may enable shareholders to impact election outcomes also means that such
rules have the ability to enhance engagement between shareholders and management. If
shareholders can realistically determine which directors remain in office, it increases
the likelihood that directors will pay heed to shareholders' concerns. Thus, the e-proxy
system appears to provide an optimal alternative to the benefits promised under proxy
access.
Then, too, as SEC Commissioner Annette Nazareth argued, the cost savings
generated by the e-proxy rules "help level the playing field between management and
dissenting shareholders."'153 Hence, the rules should reduce the relative advantage of
management nominees.
Unfortunately, it is unclear if shareholders will realize these cost savings. Given that
such savings represent the primary benefit of the e-proxy rules, that lack of clarity
diminishes significantly the viability of the e-proxy rules.
Indeed, the extent of any cost savings will be influenced by several unpredictable
factors. First, the rules do not preempt state law; thus if state law requires paper notice
of shareholder meetings or proxy materials, then soliciting shareholders will incur costs
associated with compliance with state rules. Second, the e-proxy rules provide that
solicited shareholders have the right to request a paper copy of proxy materials.154 The
SEC estimates that nineteen percent of shareholders will choose to have paper copies
sent to them, meaning that some costs associated with providing paper copies will
persist despite reliance on the e-proxy rules.155 Then, too, the SEC recognizes that the
potential percentage of investors seeking paper copies is unpredictable and may
fluctuate from year to year.156 Hence, issuers and soliciting shareholders will have to
predict the requested number of paper copies. Overestimating will mean encountering
unnecessary costs, while underestimating could increase cost dramatically because of
the expense involved with printing and furnishing proxy materials on demand. 5 7 Thus,
the SEC noted that the cost savings associated with the e-proxy rules may not be as
significant as they could be because of the need to ensure sufficient paper copies for
shareholders who request them.158 Because cost savings represents the core benefit of
mailing costs." Id. at 74,607; see also Final E-proxy Rule, supra note 141, at 4162 (noting that
reduction in printing and mailing costs and the potential decrease in costs of proxy contests
represent the most significant sources of the new rules' economic benefit).
152. See Brimer, supra note 29, at 198 (noting that e-proxy rules should increase efficiency
and effectiveness of proxy contests).
153. SEC Proposes to Modernize Rules Governing Proxy Solicitations, 37 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1958 (Dec. 5, 2005).
154. See Final E-proxy Rule, supra note 141, at 4154.
155. Id. at4162.
156. See id. at 4163.
157. See id. at 4163 (noting that cost savings will be substantially reduced if paper copies are
supplied on an on-demand basis).
158. See Proposed E-proxy Rule, supra note 143, at 74,613.
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an e-proxy regime, this uncertainty appears to moot the appeal of such rules when
compared to proxy access.
To be sure, soliciting shareholders may be able to reduce the cost associated with
making paper copies by soliciting only those shareholders who have agreed to receive
electronic copies of proxy materials. 5 9 However, since such shareholders are not
prevented from requesting paper copies, this does not avoid entirely the cost of making
such copies. Nor does such solicitation avoid the cost of uncertainty associated with
seeking to predict the number of requested paper copies. 16 In fact, this uncertainty is
increased because shareholders may revoke a permanent election to receive copies in a
certain manner. 161 At the same time, limiting proxy solicitations to a particular group
of shareholders may undermine the reach, and hence effectiveness, of a proxy battle.
Thus, soliciting shareholders may find it less appealing to choose such an option.
Regardless of whether shareholders engage in a limited solicitation or one with a
broader reach, cost concerns will persist, stripping the e-proxy rules of much of their
appeal relative to proxy access.
Ultimately, the cost savings under an e-proxy regime may depend on the extent to
which shareholders will embrace electronic-only campaigns. One cause for concern is
that prior efforts at electronic communications proved unsatisfactory. 62 Yet more
recent evidence suggests that shareholders may be more comfortable with reliance on
Internet communications. Indeed, during the 2006 proxy season, some eighty-seven
percent of shares voted were voted either electronically or telephonically.163 Moreover,
some seventy-five percent of households have Internet access, while eighty percent of
investors have Internet access. 164 The SEC believes that such levels of Internet access
merited adoption of the e-proxy rules, apparently because such levels suggest growing
• • 165
ease with reliance on the Internet. Also, the SEC expects that while first movers may
experience significant cost, that cost should decline as investors become more
comfortable with Internet-based communications.166 This suggests that while e-proxy
currently may not represent a realistic alternative to proxy access, it may be a viable
option in the future.
However, even this prediction may not be accurate. This is because general Internet
use or access may not be a reliable predictor of shareholders' willingness to depend
upon proxy dissemination through the Internet. Indeed, one study revealed that some
sixty-eight percent of shareholders would take steps to receive paper copies of their
proxy materials at least some of the time. 167 This reveals that even with Internet access,
159. See Final E-proxy Rule, supra note 141, at 4150.
160. See id. at 4154. However, the ability to predict the number of requested paper copies
with accuracy may increase over time as issuers and shareholders gain familiarity with
shareholder preferences.
161. See id. at 4154 n.86.
162. See Brimer, supra note 29, at 192 (noting problems associated with prior electronic
releases).
163. See Final E-proxy Rule, supra note 141, at 4149.
164. See id.; see also Brimer, supra note 29, at 179. Other studies reveal that Americans
spend an average of fourteen hours online each month. See id.
165. See Final E-proxy Rule, supra note 141, at 4149.
166. See id. at 4163.
167. See id.
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shareholders may desire paper copies of their proxy materials. This undermines the
extent to which we can rely on that access to support the proposition that investors will
make use of the e-proxy regime.
Perhaps more devastating to the notion that e-proxy rules can serve as an alternative
to proxy access are studies revealing reduced participation as a result of such rules. A
few studies have suggested that shareholders are more likely to cast a vote when they
receive a paper copy than when they receive an e-mail notice. For example, some forty-
nine to sixty-five percent of shareholders indicate that they may not visit the Web site
contained in an e-proxy notice, thereby reducing the level of participation under an e-
proxy regime.' 69 A more recent study reveals that within the first five months of the e-
proxy rules, retail participation fell by seventy-five percent, and thus only four percent
of retail shareholders participated in e-proxy solicitations while most others do not
bother to go online and access proxy statements. 170 This dramatically reduces the
appeal of the e-proxy rules.
Additionally, the e-proxy rules may be less appealing than proxy access because
there are some costs that persist even after elimination of printing and mailing costs.
The SEC estimated that the costs of preparing, producing, and sending the notice
required under the e-proxy rules could be about $2 million. This is because while the
e-proxy rules reduce the costs associated with mailing and printing proxy materials,
they do not impact the costs associated with hiring legal counsel and document
preparation. 72 As the SEC notes, the persistence of these costs reduces the cost
savings associated with e-proxy solicitations. 73 They also reduce the relative
attractiveness of e-proxy when compared to proxy access. Of note, the SEC estimated
that the cost associated with having shareholder nominees included on the corporate
ballot was $130,000. 174 This is a significant difference from the $2 million legal and
document preparation costs estimated under the e-proxy regime. When that cost is
added to the cost of producing paper copies, the cost savings associated with the e-
proxy rules become more apparent than real. If this is true, then such rules have no
advantage over proxy access.
Moreover, the e-proxy rules may be less ideal than proxy access because their
effectiveness, and hence any potential cost savings, may depend upon corporate actions
that may never materialize. As an initial matter, the effectiveness of the e-proxy rules
may depend upon the extent to which corporations maintain well-developed e-mail lists
for their shareholders. To be sure, federal law requires that corporations deliver to
requesting shareholders a list of the names, addresses and security positions of the
168. See id.
169. Memorandum from David Huntington, Office of the Chairman, to File S7-10-05:
Internet Availability of Proxy Materials 14 (Nov. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71005/s71005-159.pdf.
170. See TheCorporateCounsel.net Blog,
http://www.thecorporatecounsel.netfblog/archive/001628.html (Jan. 15, 2008 6:07 EST).
171. See Final E-proxy Rule, supra note 141, at 4163. The exact cost estimate was
$2,020,475. Id.
172. See id. at 4158.
173. See id. The SEC hopes that this will curtail abuses of shareholders conducting nuisance
contests. Id.
174. 2007 Shareholder Proposals, supra note 20, at 43,483.
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record and beneficial holders of a corporation's stock. 175 However, federal law only
requires that corporations deliver a list of e-mail addresses if the corporation already
maintains such a list. 176 Whether corporations maintain such a list will vary by
corporation because state statutes do not require the maintenance of such lists. For
example, Delaware law specifically disavows any requirement that corporations
.... 177
maintain e-mail address lists of shareholders. This means that shareholders may find
it difficult to secure e-mail addresses of their fellow shareholders, making reliance on
an e-proxy regime impractical.
The effectiveness of that regime also may depend upon corporations' willingness to
rely on electronic mechanisms to conduct director elections. Indeed, if corporations
choose not to conduct an Intemet-based proxy solicitation while soliciting shareholders
rely on the Internet, it could put such shareholders at a disadvantage. In this regard,
soliciting shareholders may only feel comfortable waging an Internet-based proxy
contest when corporations also engage in electronic disseminations. So what is the
likelihood that corporations will use the e-proxy rules? To be sure, the e-proxy rules
generate cost savings to both corporations and shareholders. However, there may be
less incentive for corporations to choose Internet solicitations because the corporation,
and not individual directors and officers, bears the cost of proxy solicitations.
Moreover, the knowledge that Internet solicitations could facilitate proxy contests may
curtail management's willingness to rely on the e-proxy rules. Then, too, because
corporations can choose the meetings on which to rely on the e-proxy rules,
178
managers may be able to strategically avoid reliance on such rules when there is a
strong likelihood of a proxy contest. If corporations only use e-proxies when
shareholders do not use or are otherwise less inclined to use e-proxies, shareholders
also may be less inclined to do so. If this occurs, the cost savings promised under the e-
proxy rules may never materialize.
ii. Shareholder Participation and Special Interest Shareholders
One benefit of proxy access is that it would apply to a broad spectrum of
shareholders, thereby enabling more shareholders to influence election outcomes and
corporate affairs. The e-proxy rules may enable even broader shareholder participation
than proxy access, and consequently could be viewed as more beneficial, even if only
on the margins. Thus, although some commentators requested it, the e-proxy rules do
not contain a minimum share ownership requirement. Hence, any shareholder may
rely on the notice and access model. This differs from proxy access because such
access is generally contingent on a shareholder holding a minimum amount of shares
for a specified period of time. Additionally, some proxy access proposals would
175. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2007).
176. Thus, the shareholder list must be provided in the format requested by shareholders, but
only to the extent that such form is available to the corporation "without undue burden or
expense." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a)(iii).
177. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(a) (2007) ("Nothing contained in this section shall
require the corporation to include electronic mail addresses or other electronic contact
infonnation on such list.").
178. See Final E-proxy Rule, supra note 141, at 4154.
179. Seeid. at4151, 4158.
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impose triggers for such access that would require significant shareholder support.1
80
These proposals create limitations on participation that do not exist under the e-proxy
rules. Given these limitations, the e-proxy rules enable shareholder participation on a
broader level than proxy access, suggesting that such rules may be preferable to such
access at least with respect to the issue of participation. Of course, the extent of that
preference may depend on how burdensome shareholder limitations are under a proxy
access regime.
With regard to special interest groups, the e-proxy rules appear to mirror the
protections afforded by proxy access. Indeed, the essential difference between the e-
proxy rules and proxy access is that the e-proxy rules allow for nomination through the
Internet. In most other respects, the rules are similar to proxy access and hence should
ensure the same kind of protections against special interest shareholders that exist with
proxy access. The adoption of an e-proxy regime therefore should make shareholders
no worse off with regard to special interest investors than they would be under a proxy
access regime. In this regard, if not for the concerns regarding costs, the e-proxy
regime would be a sufficient substitute for proxy access.
iii. Shareholder Control vs. Corporate Imprimatur
Some may contend that the e-proxy rules are preferable to proxy access because
they allow shareholders to control both the content of the proxy statement and the
solicitation process. Indeed, one drawback of proxy access is that when shareholder-
nominated candidates appear on the corporation's proxy statement, corporate managers
.... 181
have the right to include statements opposing such candidates. Shareholders do not
have any corresponding right to rebut management's statements or otherwise oppose
management nominees unless they choose to do so within the context of their182
statements supporting their own candidates. Such a choice is difficult to make given
the five hundred-word limit associated with such statements-a word limit not imposed
on management. 183 Moreover, such a choice is difficult given that it must be made
before shareholders have knowledge of the content of the company's statements.184 In
this regard, corporate managers in a proxy access regime would have the ability to cast
shareholder-nominated candidates in a negative light, potentially undermining the
strength of such candidates. And this ability is not subject to any word limitation. By
contrast, the e-proxy rules would allow shareholders to distribute their own supportive
proxy statement free from any negative remarks by management, and with ample
opportunity to address any concerns they have with management candidates. In this
respect, the e-proxy rules may provide a better opportunity for shareholders to garner
support for their candidates.
180. See supra note 105.
181. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(m)(1) (noting company's right to include reasons it believes
shareholders should vote against a proposal).
182. See id. (noting that shareholders may express their views in the context of their
supporting statement).
183. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d).
184. A company must send a copy of its opposing statement to shareholders before it mails
the proxy materials. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(m)(3). However, such a notification occurs after
shareholders have submitted their proposals. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e)(2).
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Moreover, the e-proxy rules grant shareholders the ability to track the level of
support their candidates receive, and hence engage in any necessary last-minute
solicitations. 1 5 By contrast, this ability is reserved to management under a proxy
access system because in that system management controls the solicitation machinery.
Given the control over the proxy statement and solicitation process afforded by the e-
proxy rules, such rules may be deemed a preferable alternative to proxy access.
Yet this control must be weighed against the potential inherent value associated with
having access to the corporate proxy statement. Such inherent value emerges in two
respects. First, there may be an advantage to having all directorial candidates' names
appear on the same ballot. Second, there may be a psychological advantage to having a
candidate appear on the corporate ballot, and hence appear to have the corporation's
imprimatur or stamp of approval. 86 On the one hand, any such advantage may be
diluted by the corporation's ability to make opposing statements regarding shareholder-
. • 187
nominated candidates. On the other hand, to the extent the corporation advances
opposing arguments against shareholder-nominated candidates, it may be more
effective to view those arguments in the context of shareholders' supporting
statements, rather than in an entirely separate document. In other words, management
arguments may be less effective when they appear next to shareholders' statements
regarding particular candidates. This is not only because shareholders are able to view
the arguments against one another, but also because shareholders' arguments may be
given more weight when they appear on a document seemingly approved by the
corporation. The fact that many shareholder proposals that appear on the corporation's
ballot have won approval despite management opposition gives credence to this
point. 188
To be sure, empirical evidence suggests that soliciting shareholders can wage an
effective proxy battle even without having their nominees on the corporation's proxy
statement. 189 However, this does not negate the possibility that including a nominee on
the corporate ballot provides some psychological advantage-it just indicates that such
an advantage can be overcome. Of course, it is difficult to prove the negative
proposition regarding whether, and to what extent, having a nominee's name appear on
the corporate proxy statement does not generate an inherent advantage. Without such
proof, however, it is also difficult to conclude that the e-proxy rules provide an
effective alternative to proxy access. Thus, even without the issues associated with
cost, e-proxy may represent a second-best alternative to proxy access.
185. The e-proxy rules enable shareholders to solicit votes and hence receive such votes from
other shareholders. As a result, those rules enable shareholders to track the voting behavior or
shareholders. By contrast, under a proxy access regime where shareholders would be entitled to
have their names included on the corporation's proxy statement, shareholders submit their votes
to the corporation and hence the corporation-and not the shareholders-have the ability to
track those votes.
186. See Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 1504 ("[I]ncumbents gain an important psychological
advantage in soliciting under the name of 'the corporation."').
187. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
188. For example, majority voting proposals have won significant shareholder support in the
last few years. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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iv. Accuracy and Security Issues
An additional drawback of the e-proxy rules may be the accuracy and security
problems associated with voting through electronic means. The e-proxy rules appear to
strongly encourage corporations to enable shareholders to vote electronically.190 At
first glance, this seems ideal because it makes use of technology. However, our
experience with federal, state, and municipal elections reveals significant defects with
electronic voting. Recent elections reveal hundreds of cases involving voting
inaccuracies including instances of misplaced votes, added votes, and switched
votes. 191 As an example, in 2000, an electronic voting machine in Iowa recorded four
million votes in a county with only three hundred voters.192 Also, a 2007 investigation
revealed that one company's electronic voting machines changed some thirty to forty
percent of votes cast. These inaccuracies associated with electronic voting may
make a regime that relies on such voting both less reliable and less desirable.
Moreover, electronic voting poses security risks. Studies reveal that electronic
voting systems are vulnerable to attack and bugs, some of which could alter the ability
of such systems to accurately record votes. 194 Experts contend that voting over the
Internet is the riskiest form of voting because of the increased exposure to viruses and
potential vote tampering. To be sure, commentators to the e-proxy proposal raised
security concerns. However, the concerns focused on issues related to confidentiality
and potential theft of shareholder information as opposed to potential attacks or other
ways in which voting systems may be compromised. As a result, the SEC's response,
which focused on ensuring that issuers and soliciting shareholders ensure
confidentiality and anonymity on the Internet, failed to capture the breadth of the'97
problem. In this regard, we should be careful adopting regimes that encourage over-
reliance on electronic voting, particularly without any assessment of accuracy or
security issues.
Corporations may eventually shift to electronic voting in some fashion.198 Hence,
the problems associated with electronic voting may exist even without reliance on an e-
proxy regime. However, at least with proxy access, electronic voting is confined to the
single voting system established by the corporation. The e-proxy rules raise the specter
190. See Final E-proxy Rule, supra note 141, at 4153. The Rule requires that the issuer
concurrently provide shareholders with at least one method of executing a proxy card, which
includes providing an electronic voting platform or a telephone number. However, merely
requiring a means to request a paper copy of the proxy card would be insufficient. See id. at
4153-54.
191. See Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. C. LEGALF. 355, 363-65
(discussing instances where thousands of votes were lost or added during various municipal,
state, and federal elections, including the presidential election).
192. Id. at 364.
193. Id. at364-65.
194. See id. at 368-69.
195. See Final E-proxy Rule, supra note 141, at 4152.
196. See id. at 4152-53.
197. See id. at4153.
198. See id. at 4152 (noting that a large majority of shares are already voted electronically).
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of multiple voting processes, and consequently multiple voting errors and security
concerns.
3. Concluding Assessments
In the end, there are many advantages to the e-proxy rules, but those advantages do
not outweigh the drawbacks of such rules, making them less preferable than proxy
access. Indeed, the e-proxy regime promises to reduce the cost associated with proxy
solicitations, a major impediment to engaging in proxy contest. By providing such cost
savings, the rules promise to make shareholders' voting power more meaningful. Yet
the cost savings associated with the rules are not only uncertain, but also may depend
on the corporation's willingness to engage in Internet-based solicitations and maintain
e-mail addresses of its shareholders. Both of these factors significantly undermine the
benefits of the e-proxy rules by stripping them of their primary advantage over proxy
access. Then, too, the possibility that proxy access would afford shareholders an
important psychological advantage may undermine the extent to which any system
promoting separate solicitations can ever be more appealing than direct access to the
corporate ballot. Finally, potential defects with electronic voting that may cause
inaccuracies in the voting process should represent a source of concern. For all ofthese
reasons, the e-proxy rules do not represent an appealing alternative to proxy access.
B. Majority Voting
1. The Majority Voting Campaign
Until recently, the vast majority of corporations elected directors based on a
plurality system.' 99 Under that system, a director is elected if she receives the most
votes cast, without regard to votes that are withheld or cast against her.
200
Theoretically, then, a director may be elected even if only one vote is cast in her favor.
Or to put it differently, a director could be elected even if ninety-nine percent of
shareholders cast a vote against her.
Several high-profile campaigns to defeat the reelection of particular directors
highlighted the limits of the plurality system. In many corporations, shareholders can
either vote for a director or withhold their vote; shareholders cannot cast a vote against
a director.201 Hence, when shareholders seek to prevent a director from being elected,
199. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTiONS ii (2007),
available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritycallen_020707.pdf.
200. See 2003 Proposed Nomination Rule, supra note 38, at 60,786 n.52; J.W. Verret,
Pandora's Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie? Majority Voting, Corporate Ballot Access, and
the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined, 62 Bus. LAW. 1007, 1010 (2007).
201. Part of the reason corporations have a withhold option, but not one providing for a vote
against a director, is grounded in the proxy rules. The proxy rules require corporations to ensure
that their proxy card has a place where shareholders can withhold their vote. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-4(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2) (2007). However, the SEC
decided against implementing a proposal that would have required proxy cards to contain a
mechanism to allow shareholders to vote against a director because of concerns about its legal
effect. See Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral
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shareholders wage "withhold-the-vote" or "just-say-no" campaigns pursuant to which
shareholders encourage others to withhold their votes from a particular director or
group of directors. 202 In 2004, shareholders of Walt Disney Corp. ("Disney") waged a
withhold-the-vote campaign against then-CEO and board chair Michael Eisner to
express their disapproval regarding his role in initiating and approvin an excessive
compensation package for former Disney president Michael Ovitz. Forty-five
percent of shareholders withheld their votes against Eisner.204 Similarly, in 2004, sixty-
one percent of shareholders withheld their votes against a slate of four directors at
Federated Department Stores, Inc. (FDS). 205 Although the FDS vote did not occur in
the context of a withhold-the-vote campaign, both it and the vote at Disney represented
the highest withheld votes in recent history. Yet they underscored the fact that, under
a plurality system, even a majority of withheld votes would not have prevented any
director's reelection.207 In this way, withhold-the-vote campaigns revealed the
difficulty of impacting election outcomes under a plurality system.
A majority voting system appears to rectify this difficulty. A true majority vote
model refers to a system pursuant to which a director must receive a majority of votes
cast during an uncontested election in order to be elected. In other words, a candidate
must receive more votes for her than are cast against her or withheld.208 Under this
model, a withhold-the-vote campaign would have a direct impact on election outcomes,
ensuring that directors who fail to receive majority shareholder support are not elected.
Such a system raises the possibility of a failed election pursuant to which no
candidate receives sufficient votes to be elected. In fact, the possibility of a failed
election is one reason why corporations embraced the plurality system.209
Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 34-16356, 44 Fed.
Reg. 68,764, 68,765 (Nov. 29, 1979).
202. Withhold-the-vote campaigns were recommended in a 1993 law review article by
former SEC Commissioner and Professor Joseph Grundfest. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote
No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 857
(1993). Withhold-the-vote campaigns must comply with the proxy rules. Generally, those rules
allow shareholders who conduct such campaigns an exemption for filing a proxy statement so
long as such shareholders do not solicit proxies during the campaign. See Rule 14a-2(b)(1), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (2007).
203. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 352 (Del. Ch. 1998), affd
in part, rev'd in part, and remanded in part sub nom., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.
Super. Ct. 2000). Indeed, Eisner encouraged Disney directors to hire Michael Ovitz. Yet almost
immediately after his hire, directors became dissatisfied with Ovitz's performance and
eventually fired him some fourteen months later. See id. Ovitz's severance package enabled him
to receive $140 million upon his termination. Id. at 350.
204. 2004 PROXY REPORT, supra note 83, at 5.
205. See id. at 9. Shareholders withheld their vote to express their dissatisfaction with
directors' decision not to implement majority voting. See id.
206. See id.
207. To be sure, the Disney vote did appear to generate indirect pressure on Eisner to resign.
Hence, within hours of the vote, Disney removed Eisner from his position as board chair, and
six months later, Eisner resigned from his post as CEO. See id. at 5.
208. Most corporations require that a candidate receive a majority of the votes present and
voting at a meeting or a majority of the quorum, as opposed to the more stringent standard of a
majority of the outstanding votes. See ALLEN, supra note 199, at iv.
209. See Verret, supra note 200, at 1010.
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Because of this and other perceived problems with a true majority voting system,
some corporations have adopted a "plurality plus" model. First introduced by Pfizer,
Inc., 21 such a model retains the plurality system as the default rule. However, a
director who fails to receive a majority of the votes cast must tender her resignation.
211
The board then has some window of time (generally ninety days) in which to determine
• . 212
if it will accept the resignation. Thus, a plurality plus system guards against a failed
election by giving corporations adequate time to find a replacement for the director
who has failed to win majority shareholder support. Though not as straightforward as a
true majority vote regime, such a model nevertheless seeks to ensure that candidates
who fail to receive majority support are not able to secure a board seat.
Recognition of the limits of the plurality system as well as frustration with the
failure of proxy access has spurred the campaign for majority voting. Over the past
three years, shareholders have submitted an increasing number of majority vote
shareholder proposals to be included on the corporation's proxr statement.' In 2004,
shareholders submitted twelve majority vote proposals. 2 4 In sharp contrast,
shareholders submitted over 150 proposals in 2006. 215 More than 150 proposals were
submitted in 2006 and 2007. 216In fact, the number of majority vote proposals
submitted in recent years far outnumbered the number of proposals submitted on other
issues, making majority vote the most high-profile issue of the recent proxy seasons.217
Moreover, such proposals have garnered a record amount of shareholder support. In
2007, the average support for such proposals topped fifty percent, up from a mere
twelve percent in 2004.218
More importantly, corporations have begun implementing majority voting systems
in record numbers. Prior to 2005, only a handful of companies had a majority voting
210. See PFIZER INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 1-2 (2008), available at
http://media.pfizer.com/files/investors/corporategovemance/cgprinciples.pdf; see also 2005
PROXY REPORT, supra note 83, at 10. Pfizer adopted the plurality plus model in June 2005. See
Press Release, Pfizer, Inc., Pfizer to Amend Corporate Governance Principles Regarding
Election of Directors (June 23, 2005), available at
http://www.pfizer.com/news/press releases/pfizer_pressreleases.jsp (follow "Press Release
Archive," then follow "2005 Archives").
211. SeePFIZER, INc.,supra note 210, at 1.
212. Id. at 2.
213. Between January 1 and June 10 of 2005, 2006, and 2007, shareholders submitted 54,
84, and 37 such proposals, respectively. See 2007 PROxY REPORT, supra note 49, at 6.
214. See Stephen Taub, Investors Back Shareholder Resolutions, CFO.coM, Aug. 22,2006,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfin/7826000?f=search.
215. 2006 PROXY REPORT, supra note 48, at 2. In 2005, Council of Institutional Investors
urged 1500 of the largest U.S. companies to adopt majority voting. See Arthur Fleischer, Jr.,
Majority Voting and Shareholder Access, in PRE-CONFERENCE BRIEFING TO THE 39TH ANNUAL
INsTrrTTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION: SHAREHOLDER AcTIvISM: FINDING THE BALANCE 313,
320 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 11508, 2007).
216. See 2007 PROxY REPORT, supra note 49, at 16.
217. See 2006 PROxY REPORT, supra note 48, at 3 chart 1.
218. See 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 6, 17. The average shareholder support was
44.3% in 2005, 47.7% in 2006, and 50.3% in 2007. Id. at 6.
219. See Fleischer, supra note 215, at 317 ("Majority voting is clearly becoming the norm in
United States corporations.").
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system in place. 220 By February 2006, sixteen percent of S&P 500 companies had
some form of majority voting regime in place.2 2 1 But by the start of the 2008 proxy
season, sixty-six percent of S&P 500 companies and fifty-seven percent of Fortune 500
companies had adopted some form of majority voting. As this empirical evidence
reveals, the voting standard at most major corporations has undergone a dramatic shift.
This shift is particularly remarkable given that corporations are under no obligation
to implement majority voting proposals. The vast majority of shareholder proposals
requesting corporations to implement majority voting have been nonbinding.22 3 Hence
corporations are not required to implement them even if they receive majority
shareholder approval. Underscoring this discretion, in previous years, corporations
largely ignored many shareholder proposals even when they garnered majority
shareholder support. Thus, the fact that corporations have chosen to comply with
shareholders' requests for majority voting highlights the success of that campaign.
Indeed, in 2007 fifty-five percent of majority vote proposals (70 out of 150) were
withdrawn, as compared to twenty-four percent in 2006 and twenty-three percent in
2005. 22 5 Generally, withdrawn proposals reflect a corporation's decision to either
adopt majority voting or put a majority voting proposal to a shareholder vote.2 26 The
high level of withdrawn proposals, therefore, further underscores the fact that
corporations are responding to the majority vote campaign even without significant
shareholder votes on them.
Then, too, the campaign for majority voting has spurred the enactment of several
laws designed to facilitate the adoption and retention of majority voting. Prior to 2006,
virtually every state as well as the American Bar Association (ABA) had embraced
plurality voting as the default rule in director elections. 22 7 Yet in 2006, California
amended its corporate code enabling corporations to adopt majority voting as the
- • • 228
default rule in the election of directors. In a similar vein, half a dozen other states
altered their corporate statutes to enable corporations to adopt a majority voting
provision through either a bylaw or charter amendment.
229
The ABA took a less drastic, but no less significant approach. 2 3 Thus, in 2006, the
ABA amended the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) to allow for the adoption
220. See Brooke A. Masters, Proxy Measures Pushing Corporate Accountability Gain
Support, WASH. POST, June 17, 2006, at Dl (noting that fewer than thirty companies had
majority vote regimes in place at the start of 2005).
221. See ALLEN, supra note 199, at i. These percentages include corporations that adopt true
majority voting regimes as well as those that have adopted a plurality plus model.
222. See id. at iii.
223. See id. at vi.
224. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 854.
225. 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 17.
226. See id.
227. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (Supp. 2008); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
7.28(a) (2007); ALLEN, supra note 199, at 4-5 n.7.
228. The California code also requires that a director who does not receive a majority vote be
removed from office within ninety days. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 708.5 (West Supp. 2009).
229. These states include Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington. See
ALLEN, supra note 199, at v-vi.
230. See COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, AM. BAR ASS'N, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS ON VOTING BY SHAREHOLDERS FOR THE ELECTION OF
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of a bylaw amendment providing a plurality plus system pursuant to which directors
who fail to receive a majority of the votes cast must tender their resignation the earlier
of ninety days or the date upon which a successor is elected. Then, too, if
shareholders adopt such a bylaw amendment, only shareholders may repeal it.232 Since
twenty-four states follow the MBCA, these changes should have a significant impact
on state statutes throughout the country.
In 2006, Delaware, the incorporation home of roughly half of public
corporations, 233 enacted two amendments to its general corporation code that facilitate
the majority vote effort. Like the ABA's changes to the MBCA, one Delaware
provision prevents the board from unilaterally repealing a stockholder-adopted bylaw
• • • 234
addressing the votes necessary for the election of a director. The other amendment
allows a board member's resignation to be effective upon a later date or future event,
and allows the resignation to be irrevocable if it is tied to a director's failure to gamer a
specified vote for reelection. 23 Other states similarly have adopted amendments
. .. . 236
enabling director resignations to be both contingent and irrevocable. While these
rules do not alter the plurality voting regime, they do facilitate the adoption and
retention of a majority vote model.
The majority vote campaign also may be boosted by a proposed New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) rule that would prevent brokers from voting beneficial ownership
shares in uncontested elections when they do not receive instructions from the record
owner.237 NYSE Rule 452 governs the discretionary voting of proxies by brokers on
behalf of customers who are beneficial owners of shares. Rule 452 requires that
brokers receive voting instructions for matters on which shareholders must vote.
However, if brokers do not receive those instructions ten days before a meeting date,
brokers have the discretion to vote on matters deemed to be "routine. 39 Under current
DIRECTORS 7 (2006),
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/newsletter/0044/materials/f3.pdf(discussing reasons for adopting
the plurality plus model).
231. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.22(a)(2) (2007); Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes
in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments to Chapter 7 and Related Provisions
Relating to Shareholder Action Without a Meeting, Chapters 8 and 10 Relating to Shareholder
Voting for the Election ofDirectors, and Chapter 13 Relating to Appraisal and Other Remedies
for Fundamental Transactions, 61 Bus. LAW. 1427, 1432-33 (2006).
232. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.22(c)(1).
233. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate
Law, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1205, 1210 (2001).
234. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 216 (Supp. 2008).
235. See DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 2008).
236. See ALLEN, supra note 199, at vi. Such states include Maine, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.
See id.
237. See Fleischer, supra note 215, at 317. As of January 2009, however, the SEC has not
acted on the NYSE proposal to amend Rule 452. See Abigail Arms, Trends in Corporate
Governance of the Largest US. Public Companies General Governance Practices, in
PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCuMENTs 2009, at 17, 29 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Series No. 18393, 2009).
238. See NYSE, Inc., Rule 452 (2009), available at
http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_2&manual=/nyse/ny
se-rules/nyse-rules/.
239. Marcel Kahn & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J.
1292 [Vol. 84:1259
THE FUTURE OF SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY
NYSE rules, uncontested director elections are deemed to be "routine" matters, and
thus brokers are permitted to vote shares held even if they do not receive voting
instructions.240 Evidence reveals that brokers overwhelmingly cast votes in favor of
management proposals and candidates. 24 1 Thus, as Professor Bernard Black notes,
Rule 452 "simply pads the affirmative vote on routine matters."242 Moreover,
shareholder activists blame the defeat of some high-profile "vote no" campaigns on the
influence of broker votes.
243
However, the NYSE has proposed amending this Rule so that brokers no longer
have such flexibility. 244 Without instructions, brokers would be prohibited from casting
shares in favor of a particular director. Thus, such shares would not be deemed
withheld unless shareholders specifically instructed brokers. Ultimately, such an
amendment not only would serve to enhance the impact of a majority voting rule by
reducing the block of favorable votes directors usually receive from brokers during
uncontested elections, but also would enhance shareholder voice by ensuring that votes
cast in favor of a candidate truly reflect shareholders' voting preferences.
As this discussion reveals, majority voting not only has become the norm in many
corporations, but several new initiatives augment the majority vote regime. Illustrative
of the success of the majority vote campaign is a Latham & Watkins LLP report that
advised its clients not to resist shareholder proposals requesting majority vote
structures, noting that the issue had "left the proverbial station," and that there were no
effective "sound bites" against shareholder demands for majority vote. 245 Other
experts, including Martin Lipton, predict that the majority voting standard will soon be
universal.
246
2. Probing the Effectiveness of Majority Voting
As a descriptive matter, and despite predictions regarding universality, majority
voting does not as yet broadly apply to most shareholders. A corporation's decision to
establish a majority voting system is voluntary, and thus it is not inevitable that such
systems will apply to all corporations or even every public corporation. While the
majority voting movement has experienced tremendous success, there still exist many
companies that have a plurality system in place. Currently thirty-four percent of S&P
500 companies and forty-three percent of Fortune 500 companies have not adopted any
247form of majority voting. This makes the current majority voting system less
1227, 1250 (2008).
240. Verret, supra note 200, at 1040.
241. See Black, supra note 51, at 561.
242. Id.
243. See 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 29 (noting belief that broker votes were
decisive in defeating the withhold-the-vote campaign against directors at CVS).
244. See PROXY WORKING GRouP, NYSE, INC., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 20-23
(2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/REVISEDNYSE Report 6 5 06.pdf.
245. LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, MAJORITY VOTE FOR DIRECTORS: THE LATEST CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE INITATWVE 1-3 (2005),
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/publ437_ 1.pdf.
246. See Martin Lipton, What Directors Can Expect in the New Year, COMPLIANCE WEEK,
Jan. 3,2006, http://www.complianceweek.com/article/2161/what-directors-can-expect-in-the-
new-year.
247. See ALLEN, supra note 199, at iii.
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attractive than proxy access, which, if properly implemented, would broadly apply to
all public companies.24 8 However, even if majority voting were universal, the next
sections reveal several reasons why majority voting nevertheless is less attractive than
proxy access.
i. Direct and Indirect Impact
Majority voting ensures that a withhold-the-vote campaign actually impacts election
outcomes. It therefore represents a particularly strong alternative to proxy access.249
Professor Joseph Grundfest, an early advocate of withhold-the-vote campaigns, notes
that majority voting also has an indirect benefit. Thus, by enabling shareholders to
reject specific directors, majority voting may serve to communicate shareholders'
250discontent with particular directors or their policies. Because it allows shareholders
to impact corporate affairs both directly and indirectly, majority voting appears to be
an ideal mechanism for invigorating shareholders' voting rights.
One potential drawback of majority voting is that, despite shareholder support,
shareholders may be reluctant to utilize the power inherent in such voting. Very few
directors receive more than fifty percent of votes cast against them. In 2006, just eight
out of 31,000 directors received more than fifty percent shareholder opposition.251 In
2007, only one director received a majority "against vote" at companies with majority
vote regimes. 252 One reason for these low numbers may be shareholders' reluctance to
use such a powerful tool. Indeed, other scholars have recognized that while
shareholders may be willing to withhold votes when such an action is merely symbolic,
such willingness may wane when the action actually has an impact on director's
position.253 This is especially true if such action could impact the corporation and its
performance. 254 To be sure, shareholders should use their removal power with caution.
However, if shareholders experience too much reluctance in wielding their authority,
then a majority vote system will prove ineffective.
Of course, even if shareholders exercise their power, it is simply not as potent as the
direct power inherent in proxy access because it is a negative right.255 The fact that
248. Some proxy access proposals allow corporations to opt into proxy access, hence even
proxy access does not promise universal coverage. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
Yet recent proposals allow shareholders the choice of deciding whether to implement proxy
access or one that broadly covers all public corporations. See supra Part II.B.
249. See Wutkowski, supra note 4 (quoting Professor Grundfest, a former SEC
commissioner, regarding the significance of majority voting to shareholder empowerment).
250. See Grundfest, supra note 202, at 865-66.
251. 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 28.
252. See ALLEN, supra note 199, at i, 177 n.156.
253. See Verret, supra note 200, at 1035.
254. See id.
255. Of course, the fact that it is a negative right can be viewed as beneficial to shareholders
for at least two reasons. First, it may alleviate any problems associated with gaining shareholder
agreement on a particular candidate. Indeed, shareholders have varied, and sometimes divergent,
interests. See e.g., hnan Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53
UCLA L. REv. 561, 564 (2006) (noting the distinct and sometimes conflicting interests among
shareholders); K.A.D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. L. 219, 229-42
(2005) (discussing divergent concerns among investors). Their diversity of interests may make it
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majority voting serves as only a veto power means that it does not provide shareholders
with the positive right to put forth the candidates of their choice. Thus, shareholders
cannot determine the identity of the successor director even if they manage to remove a
particular candidate. This makes it less viable than proxy access.
To be sure, even if shareholders refuse to actually employ their removal power,
majority vote regimes nevertheless could have an indirect influence on corporate
practices. As Grundfest insists, the most significant benefit of withhold-the-vote
campaigns, and hence majority voting, may be its ability to indirectly impact corporate
behavior.256 The problem with a plurality voting system was that it posed no genuine
threat of removal, and thus votes cast under that system were unlikely to shape director
behavior. Majority voting rectifies this problem, thereby ensuring that a withhold-the-
vote campaign represents a credible threat of removal for directors. 257 That threat
should serve to indirectly pressure directors to undertake policies consistent with
shareholders' interests. In fact, in some instances where votes fell short of a majority,
directors nevertheless were removed. 25 In this regard, we should expect shareholders
to exercise their removal power rarely because the threat should be sufficient to
encourage directors and officers to conform their behavior in a manner beneficial to
shareholders. Thus, even if shareholders seldom affirmatively remove directors from
office, majority voting can have a powerful impact on corporate behavior.
Because majority voting embodies the ability to indirectly influence corporations, it
may be viewed as a viable alternative to proxy access. However, this viability may be
compromised significantly because, as Part III.E emphasizes, indirect power is only as
strong as the direct power upon which it is based. Hence, the significance of the
indirect power promised by majority voting is diminished not only because the direct
power inherent in proxy access is more potent than that in a majority vote system, but
also because, as Part III.2.c will reveal, there exist flaws in the majority vote regime
that may make its power illusory.
ii. Shareholder Participation and Special Interests Shareholders
Majority voting does appear to be an adequate alternative to proxy access with
respect to ensuring a broad cross-section of shareholder participation. Thus, similar to
proxy access, majority voting requires that shareholders cooperate with one another to
obtain the majority vote necessary to defeat particular candidates. Empirical evidence
underscores this phenomenon, revealing that a variety of different shareholders have
worked together to ensure the success of a majority voting campaign.259 A similar
far easier for shareholders to collaborate when the only issue is rejection of an incumbent
candidate and the status quo, as opposed to seeking agreement on a particular candidate.
Second, majority voting may be ideal because it leaves the choice regarding the nomination of
directorial candidates to the discretion of the board, thus alleviating concerns regarding
competency. See ALLEN, supra note 199, at iv (describing mechanics of majority voting, which
does not impact the ability to nominate a candidate).
256. See Grundfest, supra note 202, at 866.
257. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 878; Grundfest, supra note 202, at 865. To be sure, it
remains possible that if shareholders are reluctant to use their withhold power, then the threat
also may ring hollow.
258. See 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 30.
259. Given the high levels of support for majority voting, no one class of shareholder would
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collaboration would need to occur in order for majority voting to be effective. By
encouraging such collaboration, majority voting represents an ideal mechanism through
which shareholders can effectuate their power. Moreover, because it facilitates such
collaboration in a manner similar to proxy access, it represents an ideal substitute for
proxy access.
Given this need for collaboration, the majority voting system also guards against the
possibility that shareholders with special or narrow interests will be able to advance
their personal agendas. As pointed out previously, one concern continuously raised in
the context of shareholder power is that such power may confer power on shareholders
whose interests diverge from those of the broader shareholder class. Thus, Professor
Stephen Bainbridge emphasized this possibility in his criticism of Bebchuk's proposal
for shareholder empowerment.260 At least some evidence supports this phenomenon.
As Part I.B revealed, investors with more tailored interests have dominated the
shareholder proposal process. To the extent majority voting gives greater power to
these investors, it also gives them the power to further advance those interests.
However, this power may be muted by the fact that such investors need to obtain the
support of other shareholders, and thus only those candidates who appeal to all
shareholders will be successful in gaining the requisite support. Also, the evidence of
shareholder collaboration during recent voting campaigns reveals that the need to
garner a significant level of shareholder support causes investors to shape their agenda
in a manner aimed at appealing to the broadest range of shareholders. Thus, to the
extent majority voting relies on significant shareholder support for success, the existing
evidence suggests that shareholders will continue to work together, decreasing the
possibility that personal issues will improperly dominate voting campaigns. Then, too,
because it guards against capture by narrow shareholder groups in a manner similar to
proxy access, majority voting seems to be a suitable substitute for such access, even if
it does not promise more than a proxy access regime.
iii. Power and Its Illusions
Unfortunately, the rights conferred under the majority voting regime could be
illusory, making the benefits of a majority voting system illusory as well. As an initial
matter, corporations continue to control the resignation decision in at least two
respects. In corporations that have adopted plurality plus regimes, the decision
regarding resignation is left to the board's discretion. Most director resignation policies
give the board wide discretion.262 Thus, boards can reject a director's resignation for
reasons unconnected to a particular director's performance. 263 Of note, some
corporations provide that a director resignation can be made irrevocable. However,
even those corporations retain the discretion to reject such resignations. Then, too,
some corporations provide that a director's resignation may be rejected only upon a
be sufficient to garner such support. Instead, the nature of the support indicates that different
types of shareholders combined to support majority voting.
260. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 9, at 1754-57.
261. See 2004 PROXY REPORT, supra note 83, at 28.
262. See ALLEN, supra note 199, at iv.
263. See id. Because of concerns associated with the discretion afforded directors under the
plurality plus regime, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) began recommending against
such voting policies. See id. at 217.
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compelling reason.264 Yet recently, two of those corporations amended their majority
voting provisions to eliminate the "compelling reasons" clause. 26 Such actions
demonstrate the ease with which directors can eliminate some of the protections
afforded under majority voting, while underscoring the fact that directors prefer broad
discretion over these matters. That discretion means that directors, not shareholders,
control the extent to which directors who fail to receive majority shareholder support
can remain in office. In effect, therefore, that discretion could nullify the impact of
majority voting. This latent ability to nullify the threat posed by majority voting not
only diminishes its ability to increase shareholder power, but also diminishes its
desirability as a substitute for proxy access.
The number of corporations with plurality plus models embracing this kind of
discretion is not insignificant. Currently, twenty-two percent of S&P 500 companies
.... 266
and nineteen percent of Fortune 500 companies have plurality plus regimes. Hence,
a large percentage of corporations retain the flexibility to reject director resignations,
thereby undermining shareholders' ability to impact election outcomes. To be sure, the
current trend appears to be away from the plurality plus model. Thus, while in 2006
eighty percent of adopting corporations gravitated toward a plurality plus system, in
2007 only forty-seven percent of companies adopting majority voting chose a plurality
plus model. As a result, true majority voting models dominate the landscape by a
two-to-one margin. 26 Despite this trend, there remains a significant number of
corporations that have a plurality plus system, which means there remains a significant
number of corporations with discretion over the resignation process, and hence that can
mute the impact of majority voting.
Then, too, even boards with true majority voting regimes retain discretion to reject
director resignations. The distinction between a plurality plus regime and a true
majority vote regime is that a director who fails to receive a majority of the votes in the
latter regime is not duly elected. In this regard, corporations operating under a true
majority vote model do not have any discretion over whether directors seeking election
for the first time actually remain in office. However, a true majority vote system has a
different impact for incumbent director because such directors are covered by the so-
called "holdover rule." Under that rule, a director remains in office until her successor
is duly elected. 269 Hence, if an incumbent director fails to receive the requisite majority
vote, but there is no successor to take her place, the incumbent director remains in
office until a new director is chosen. The holdover rule was designed to guard against a
failed election. However, if the holdover rule remains in effect, a director who fails to
receive a majority of the votes would continue in office until another director is elected
to replace her, thereby defeating the impact of the majority voting system.
264. See id. at iv.
265. See id. (General Electric Co. and JPMorgan Chase & Co.).
266. See id. at iii-iv.
267. See id. at ii. The trend to move away from the plurality model was sparked by Intel
Corporation's adoption of a true majority regime as well as ISS's refusal to support such
models.
268. See id. at iii-iv. Thus, forty-four percent of S&P 500 companies and thirty-eight percent
of Fortune 500 companies have true majority systems.
269. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 141(b) (Supp. 2008); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.05(e)
(2007).
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While corporations have sought to ameliorate the holdover problem, it continues to
diminish the power of majority voting. Some corporations have amended the holdover
rule to require that a director who fails to receive a majority vote must automatically
tender her resignation. 27 Others have adopted provisions requiring that such directors
leave office within a set period of time, generally ninety days. Such a provision is
consistent with that embraced by the ABA. However, when such resignations are
tendered, boards remain free to accept or reject them. Then, too, even if a director
resigns, the board retains the power to fill the vacancy. Such power once again ensures
that directors have the ability to determine the composition of the board, muting the
effect of majority voting. The fact that even under a true majority voting system
incumbent directors can remain in office and/or the existing board can determine who
serves as a replacement director means that the majority voting system may only
provide the illusion of shareholder power, which has led two commentators to call
majority voting "little more than smoke and mirrors." 27 1
In fact, a majority vote system may depend upon proxy access to be effective,
because if directors lose their seats, the nomination ability provided by proxy access
could ensure that shareholders have some part in choosing their ultimate replacement.
In addition to control over resignation, many boards retain the ability to repeal
majority voting provisions, therefore retaining the ability to eliminate shareholder gains
in this area. First, there are several corporations that only have adopted a majority
voting policy.272 Hence some nineteen percent of S&P 500 companies and seventeen
percent of Fortune 500 companies have adopted majority voting policies. 273 Such
policies are embodied in a corporation's governance guidelines as opposed to its
charter or bylaws, which means that the policies are not binding. Hence, the policies
can potentially be ignored or easily amended. Like plurality plus, the current trend is
away from adopting majority vote procedures in the form of policies. 274 The
percentage of companies adopting policies has declined while the percentage adopting
either bylaw or charter provisions have increased.275 Nevertheless, there remains a
significant portion of companies embracing such policies, leaving open the possibility
that they can be discarded at any time.
The vast majority of corporations have implemented majority vote provisions in
their bylaws. Generally, bylaws may be amended by either shareholders or the
.- 276 .
corporation, which means that in many instances directors retain the power to easily
repeal majority vote provisions, thus nullifying the right embedded in those provisions.
However, many states and corporations have enacted provisions requiring that majority
vote procedures adopted by shareholders may be amended or repealed only by
270. See ALLEN, supra note 199, at 171 (noting resignation policy of General Electric Co.).
271. William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of
Directors, 40 CONN. L. REv. 459, 487 (2007).
272. In fact, Pfizer adopted majority voting in the form of a policy. See ALLEN, supra note
199, at ii.
273. See id. at iii.
274. See id. at ii.
275. Thus, in February 2006, seventy-nine percent of companies adopting a majority vote
provision did so by way of a policy. In comparison, by the start of 2008, only forty-two percent
of companies chose to adopt a majority voting provision via a policy. See id. at ii.
276. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (2007).
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shareholders.277 These provisions may seem to protect such provisions from
management interference. However, if corporations adopt bylaw changes, then they
have the ability to repeal those changes. Recognizing the flexibility this ability affords,
corporate experts like Martin Lipton have recommended that corporations take the
initiative in putting forth and approving majority vote proposals. In 2007, roughly
fifty percent of majority vote proposals were withdrawn, which means that they did
not come to a shareholder vote; rather corporations took the initiative in enacting them
•280
without shareholder action. While activists may view such managerial pro-action as
a victory, they also should recognize that such management-adopted standards leave
open the possibility that corporate managers can determine the fate of those
standards.
3. Concluding Assessments
On the one hand, majority voting appears to be a promising mechanism for
enhancing the shareholder vote. On the other hand, there are several drawbacks that
make such a measure less attractive than proxy access. Indeed, majority voting is not
yet universal and the potential that it may never apply to all public corporations may
undercut its attractiveness. Yet even if it did apply to large numbers of corporations,
majority voting has several flaws that mute its effectiveness. Most notably, the
discretion boards retain over defeated directors' decisions to resign blunts the impact
of any potential for enhanced shareholder power. Additionally, the control many
corporations retain over the repeal process for majority voting provisions may undercut
the effectiveness, as well as the permanence, of that regime. In this regard majority
voting appears to promise more than it actually delivers, leading skeptics to conclude
that the primary reason why corporations acceded so quickly to shareholder demands
to implement majority voting was corporate managers' recognition that such demands
ultimately offered little more than the illusion of increased shareholder power.
282
A final point to consider is that proxy access mutes the significance of majority
voting, because proxy access increases the likelihood of a proxy contest. The vast
majority of majority voting policies contain provisions providing that the plurality
standard remains the default rule whenever there is a contested election. Hence,
proxy access could cancel out majority voting in many instances, which suggests that
277. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 216 (Supp. 2008).
278. See Lipton, supra note 246.
279. See 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 17.
280. See id. (noting that proposals have been withdrawn primarily because companies have
agreed to amend their bylaws and allow for majority voting).
281. If proxy access occurs by way of a bylaw, then similar concerns may be raised about
such a mechanism. However, the SEC's latest rule appears to have foreclosed bylaw proposals
as a possibility. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text. Instead, it is likely that if proxy
access occurs, it will be through a more permanent vehicle, such as a change in the proxy rules
themselves.
282. See Sjostrom & Kim, supra note 271, at 487-89.
283. See ALLEN, supra note 199, at iv (noting that ninety-two percent of majority voting
provisions have carve-outs for contested elections).
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proxy access could make majority voting, if not moot, then certainly a less important
phenomenon.
C. Electronic Shareholder Forums
1. A New Platform for Discourse?
In 2008, the SEC adopted rules facilitating the use of electronic shareholder
forums.284 As noted in Part I, the proxy rules require that any solicitation of proxies be
accompanied by filing of a proxy statement. 285 Solicitation has been defined broadly to
include not just a request for proxy authority, but also any communication reasonably
calculated to result in the attainment, withholding, or revocation of a proxy.286 This
definition encompasses any actions aimed at influencing the voting of proxies.
287
Based on this definition, many communications among shareholders could be
construed as proxy solicitations and therefore be subject to the filing requirements
under the proxy rules. If that occurs, it could stifle communications between
shareholders. However, the new amendments provide that communications made in an
electronic forum are exempt from the proxy rules so long as certain conditions are
satisfied. 288 These exemptions mean that shareholders involved in such a forum need
not be worried about potentially complying with the expensive process of filing a
proxy statement.
289
In addition, the new rules provide a safe harbor for solicitations. Thus, any proxy
solicitation on an electronic shareholder forum will be exempt so long as it occurs
more than sixty days prior to the announced date of a shareholder meeting, or if the
announcement occurs less than sixty days prior to the meeting, no more than two days
after the announcement. 29 In this respect, the new rules ensure that people who make
solicitations on an electronic forum can still request proxy authority after such
solicitation.
29 1
The SEC also enacted new Rule 14a-7, which provides liability protection for those
who host electronic forums. Rule 14a-7 provides that people who maintain or operate
284. See Electronic Shareholder Forums, Exchange Act Release No. 57,172, Investment
Company Act Release No. 28,124, 73 Fed. Reg. 4450 (Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Electronic
Shareholder Forums]. The rules took effect February 25, 2008. See id.
285. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (2007).
286. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(1); see also Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d
793, 796 (2d Cir. 1985) (defining a solicitation as any communication that is part of a
continuous plan that will result in a request for a proxy).
287. See Electronic Shareholder Forums, supra note 284, at 4453.
288. See id. The rules add a new exemption to Rule 14a-2, making clear that participation in
an electronic shareholder forum would not constitute a solicitation so long as the soliciting
person, directly or indirectly, does not seek the power to act as a proxy.
289. While the proposing amendment sought comments on whether electronic shareholder
forums should supplant the nonbinding shareholder proposal process, the SEC decided against
supplanting Rule 14a-8. See id. at 4452. Instead, the communications serve as an additional
device for communications between shareholders and managers.
290. See id. at 4453.
291. See id.
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an electronic shareholder forum will not be held liable for statements or information
supplied by a third party participating in their forum.
292
2. Benefits and Drawbacks of Online Forums
By removing the two major obstacles to participation in shareholder forums, these
new rules facilitate shareholder communications. Indeed, the SEC identified two key
concerns related to the effective use of Internet-based forums. One was the potential
burden of preparing and delivering proxy materials, and the other related to potential
liability for such sites.293 The new rules respond to both concerns. As compared to
proxy access, the rules may serve as a more effective source of communication
between shareholders and the corporation. The rules also enable corporations to
interact with shareholders in a more informal setting, and to engage in such interactions
throughout the year, which represents an improvement over using the proxy apparatus
as a communicative device because such an apparatus only can be used periodically,
and at a great expense. Such forums also may facilitate broader participation because
they allow participation by those who would not otherwise use the proxy apparatus or
attend a shareholder meeting in person. Thus, the electronic shareholder forums
enhance the potential for better communication in ways that proxy access cannot.
Then, too, electronic shareholder forums potentially provide shareholders with a
vehicle for influencing corporate affairs in a manner superior to proxy access. At best,
by potentially encouraging dialogue during proxy solicitations, proxy access represents
an indirect and infrequent form of communication between shareholders and the
corporation. By contrast, corporations may use electronic shareholder forums to obtain
shareholder input into polices and to determine shareholders' sentiments on those
polices. 294 This forum access enables shareholders to have a direct voice in shaping
corporate affairs. Then, too, electronic shareholder forums enable back and forth
communication, encouraging genuine dialogue between corporations and their
shareholders. Therefore, these forums may promote communication in a manner that is
more beneficial than proxy access.
Electronic shareholder forums also may facilitate enhanced communication between
shareholders, reducing the cost of collective action. Moreover, because shareholders
can solicit proxies even if they participate in such forums, these new rules enhance the
ability of shareholders to wage effective proxy contests and other voting campaigns. As
an example, Eric Jackson, an individual shareholder at Yahoo!, led an online withhold-
the-vote campaign against three directors that ultimately garnered thirty-one percent of
the shareholder vote.295 This example reveals that expanded use of the Internet enables
shareholders with small resources to organize more effectively. Thus, electronic
shareholder forums not only afford shareholders the opportunity to assess other
shareholders' appetite for various actions, but also enable shareholders to build
292. See id. at 4454.
293. See id. at 4453-54.
294. See id. at 4451.
295. 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 11. Jackson's campaign stemmed from his
frustration with the directors' approval of a CEO salary of $107.5 million despite the company
share price falling by almost ten percent. See id.
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coalitions around various issues. In this regard, electronic shareholder forums represent
a more cost effective mechanism for shareholders to interact with one another.
Unfortunately, it is unclear if electronic shareholder forums will evolve into
effective communicative tools. Indeed, the choice of hosting or engaging in such a
forum is completely voluntary. Thus, the potential communicative benefits between
corporations and shareholders depend upon whether and to what extent corporations
utilize electronic shareholder forums. If corporations do not feel comfortable or are
unwilling to use such forums as a mechanism to gain shareholder input on policies, the
ability of such forums to give greater voice to shareholders will be diminished. Then,
too, the potential impact of enhanced collective action among shareholders is
uncertain. Indeed, several commentators worried that electronic shareholder forums
could evolve into mere chat rooms for shareholders.296 If this occurs, then the value of
such forums will be reduced significantly. Thus, while these forums represent an
important development, it is too soon to determine how significant they will be in
promoting more effective communication. This concern alone may demonstrate that
such forums are not suitable substitutes for proxy access.
In addition, shareholder forums actually may stifle effective communication. In the
context of electronic shareholder meetings, shareholder activists have complained that
electronic forms of communications may inhibit real dialogue between shareholders
and management. These activists contend that face-to-face communication is superior
to electronic communication because it allows for deliberation and confrontation. 297 In
contrast, it may be difficult to generate meaningful discourse and debate with the large
number of shareholders that may participate in an online forum. Moreover, shareholder
advocates worry that online forums may be a way for corporations to avoid interacting
with shareholders, 298 because e-mails can be ignored, while corporations cannot avoid
answering questions when they are posed in person at a meeting.
299
The concerns raised in the context of electronic shareholder meetings seem to have
some saliency in the context of shareholder forums. To be sure, shareholder forums are
not designed to supplant the shareholder meeting, and hence they do not supplant
shareholders' ability for face-to-face interactions with corporate managers.
Nevertheless, there is a possibility that such forums may enable managers to more
easily ignore or otherwise avoid interactions with shareholders. Moreover, it is possible
that such forums undermine meaningful discourse and debate not only because they do
not present a controlled flow of communication, but also because they occur in the
context of comments by a large group of shareholders. Of course, proxy access is not a
form of face-to-face interaction, and hence a similar complaint may be lodged against
such access. However, unlike the e-mails generated on shareholder forums, it is
difficult for corporations to ignore shareholder concerns or candidates when they
appear on the corporation's own ballot. Indeed, some analysts have suggested that
296. See Electronic Shareholder Forums, supra note 284, at 4457.
297. See, e.g., Daniel Adam Birnhak, Online Shareholder Meetings: Corporate Law
Anomalies or the Future of Governance?, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 423, 445
(2003); Elizabeth Boros, Virtual Shareholder Meetings, DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 8,9 (2004); see
also SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE LAW AND REGULATION §
8.04 (John F. Olson & Carmen J. Lawrence eds., 3d ed. 2002).
298. See Birnhak, supra note 297, at 445-46.
299. See id. at 445.
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shareholders' ability to raise concerns and issues on the corporation's ballot is one
important way for shareholders to begin dialogue with the corporation,300 because
when issues or candidates appear on the corporation's ballot, the corporation often
feels compelled to respond. In this regard, proxy access virtually guarantees some
coherent response to shareholder issues or candidates.30' As activists note in the
context of virtual meetings, there is no guarantee of such response with regard to
electronic communications.
3. Concluding Assessments
While shareholder forums promise advantages with respect to enhanced
communications, there is reason to doubt that those advantages will ever materialize. In
addition, it is probably not accurate to contend that electronic shareholder forums
could supplant proxy access, because while they may afford shareholders some
enhanced access to corporations, they do not grant shareholders any affirmative powers
to determine election outcomes or any other business decision.
D. Board Declassification
1. The Annual Election Campaign
Shareholder activists contend that staggered or classified boards reduce their
power. 30 2 Staggered or classified boards refer to boards in which only a portion of the
membership is reelected each year. Typically, that portion is one-third. Staggered
boards prevent shareholders from replacing the entire board in one election cycle,
which hinders shareholders' ability to elect a majority of the board, and hence change
control of the corporation. By making it difficult to change control of the corporation,
staggered boards also make it difficult for shareholders to shift the manner in which
corporations conduct business. This difficultly is particularly relevant in the context of
proxy battles or hostile takeovers because even if a shareholder is successful in gaining
a majority of shares or otherwise electing members of the board, that success will not
translate into an ability to alter the composition of the entire board, and hence will not
translate into a true change in control. In fact, some scholars contend that the true
power of shareholders' voting rights is only realized in the context of change of control
transactions such as takeovers when there is an ability to alter the course of corporate
conduct.304 Moreover, the threat of such transactions increase managerial
accountability by ensuring that corporate managers respond to shareholder concerns in
an effort to fend off transactions pursuant to which they could be replaced. However,
300. See W. Trexler Proffitt, Jr. & Andrew Spicer, Shaping the Shareholder Activism
Agenda: Institutional Investors and Global Social Issues, 4 STRATEGIC ORG. 165, 173-74
(2006).
301. See id.
302. There is also evidence that staggered boards not only reduce shareholder returns, but
also correlate with low firm value. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 853.
303. Rivka Weill, Declassifying the Classified, 31 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 891, 895 (2006).
304. See CLARK, supra note 11, at 95.
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by hindering shareholder ability to effectuate a change in control, staggered boards
sterilize shareholders' voting power in these contexts.
For almost two decades, shareholders have sought to abolish staggered board terms,
and thereby require all directors to be elected annually. Thus, shareholders have
submitted proposals seeking to abolish staggered boards for years.305 And those
proposals have garnered consistently high levels of shareholder support. 306 Since 2000,
such proposals have averaged more than fifty percent shareholder support.30 7 In the
past few years, the number of shareholder proposals seeking to eliminate staggered
boards has not been as high as majority voting proposals. 308 However, they have
received more support.
30 9
While the efforts to dismantle staggered boards are not new, historically they have
not been very successful. Thus, in the past, most boards appeared to have simply
ignored shareholders' request for change in this arena. Indeed, a study by Bebchuk
reveals that by the fall of 2004, more than two-thirds of the shareholder proposals
receiving majority support to dismantle staggered boards had not been implemented. 310
Moreover, his study revealed that directors refused to implement an annual election
system even when proposals received majority shareholder support two or three years
in a row.3 11 Hence, in the past, corporations mainly disregarded shareholders' efforts to
implement an annual election system.
By contrast, corporations are now responding positively to campaigns to abolish
staggered boards. In fact, by the end of 2006, directors at a majority of S&P 500
companies were eligible to be elected annually.312 This trend appears as if it will
continue into subsequent proxy seasons.313 Thus, similar to the campaign for majority
voting, the declassification effort has resulted in a dramatic change in board structure at
major corporations.
2. Demystifying Declassifying Boards
To be sure, annual elections are a long way from being universal, so we cannot rely
on them as the primary vehicle for augmenting shareholder power. Indeed, some forty
percent of S&P 500 corporations continue to employ staggered terms.3 14 Then, too, the
declassification effort is not having the same traction at smaller companies. Only forty-
one percent of mid-cap companies and forty-two percent of small-cap companies have
305. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 852.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. Thus, such proposals received an average shareholder support of 60.5% in 2005,66.8%
in 2006, and 63.9% in 2007. 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 6.
309. See 2006 PROXY REPORT, supra note 48, at 3-4. In the first half of 2005, only forty-two
proposals were submitted regarding declassification, while eighty-four majority vote proposals
were submitted relating to majority voting during that same period. Id. at 3 chart 1.
310. Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 854 (examining the period from1997-2003).
311. See id. at 854-55.
312. See 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 23. About sixty percent of S&P companies
have converted to annual elections. Id.
313. See id.
314. See id.
1304 [Vol. 84:1259
THE FUTURE OF SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY
declassified their boards, 315 which means that there are a significant number of
corporations that do not have annual elections, and hence that potentially undercut
shareholder voting power.
However, even if declassification were to become universal, it would not be
preferable to proxy access. Declassification merely facilitates shareholders' ability to
elect an entire board. In so doing, such declassification does not just increase the
voting power of shareholders in ordinary elections, but also enables bidding companies
or shareholders to gain control of a corporation during takeover transactions, thereby
enhancing the shareholder vote during those transactions as well. However, it does not
facilitate shareholders' ability to remove individual board members. In this regard, the
declassification effort may need the support of the majority voting effort to be
effective. Moreover, because declassification does not affirmatively enable
shareholders to determine the members of the board, it also needs the support ofproxy
access. Thus, while declassification may be an important and perhaps necessary
component of any shareholder voting rights' campaign, it cannot supplant the effort to
achieve proxy access.
E. "It's the Indirect Benefits, Stupid! "316
The foregoing discussion reveals that there are flaws with each of the alternative
mechanisms for increasing shareholder power that undermine their ability to directly
impact election outcomes and hence make them less attractive than proxy access.
Of course, Bebchuk and others have argued that one of the primary benefits of
increased shareholder power is the ability to indirectly influence corporate affairs.317 In
this regard, the principal purpose of such increased power is not to actually effectuate a
particular action such as electing or removing a director. Rather, the purpose is to
facilitate increased dialogue between shareholders and managers so that managers act
in ways that benefit shareholders.
Viewed from this indirect purpose, one can argue that it is a mistake to discount any
mechanism simply because it may fail to achieve its direct goal. Hence, the fact that the
e-proxy rules may fail to generate significant cost savings, majority voting may prove
illusory, and shareholder forums may evolve into mere chat rooms ignored by
corporate managers may not be enough to undermine their viability. Instead, the more
relevant inquiry should focus on whether any of these mechanisms can generate
indirect benefits for shareholders by prompting corporations to increase engagement
with shareholders.
Some preliminary and anecdotal evidence suggests that some of the recent
mechanisms can in fact produce indirect benefits. According to proxy analysts, the
recent proxy seasons have revealed unprecedented levels of engagement between318
shareholders and management. Presumably some of that increased engagement may
be attributed to the fact that shareholders' powers have increased with regarding to
majority voting and declassification. Moreover, there have been several instances
where managers have acceded to shareholders' demands even when shareholders failed
315. Id.
316. Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 878.
317. See id.
318. 2007 PROXY REPORT, supra note 49, at 3.
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to directly impact election outcomes. These concessions suggest that shareholders can
achieve their goals without direct action. Moreover, it suggests that some alternative
mechanisms can impact shareholder power by increasing managers' willingness to
engage shareholders and take their concerns seriously.
Yet a deeper probe of the proxy data cast doubt on this suggestion. Thus, despite the
instances where corporations acceded to shareholder demands without direct
shareholder intervention, there exist many more cases where managers have refused to
engage with shareholders. These cases can best be interpreted as instances where
managers feel free to ignore shareholder action because they do not fear any
repercussions. In fact, a study on withhold-the-vote campaigns, and hence majority
voting, found that while such voting had produced some indirect benefits, such benefits
were episodic at best.319 Then, too, although there has been an increase in engagement
between shareholders and managers, it is not clear if that increase stemmed from the
possibility that shareholders would gain proxy access or from the implementation of
other mechanisms.
It is clear, however, that shareholders' indirect power is only as potent as the direct
threat upon which that power is based. Indeed, when Bebchuk focused on indirect
benefits, he focused on those measures where shareholders do in fact have some direct
voice in the corporate process, such as the ability to vote on fundamental changes.320 It
is in these circumstances that Bebchuk notes that the ability to have a direct impact
need not be exercised because the threat of such an impact should be sufficient to
influence director conduct. In this regard, Bebchuk's observation regarding indirect
benefits can best be understood as recognizing that when shareholders do have the
ability to directly impact corporate decisions, such ability translates into the power to
indirectly influence corporate affairs. 321 Hence, it would be a mistake to presume that a
mechanism's inability to directly influence election outcomes has no bearing on its
propensity to procure indirect benefits, which means that to the extent that other
mechanisms are flawed or otherwise less effective than proxy access, they are less
effective with regard to their potential to advance indirect benefits. By comparison,
because proxy access offers the most potent direct threat, it is also the most likely to
yield indirect benefits.
F. The Importance of the "Bird in the Hand"
Some might argue that focusing on proxy access in lieu of other mechanisms for
increasing shareholder power may be impractical, and hence less efficient and less
effective. In other words, shareholder activists should adopt a "bird in the hand"
approach and focus on strengthening their existing gains as opposed to securing a
measure that has thus far been out of reach. Indeed, shareholders have made important
319. See Diane Del Guerico, Laura Seery & Tracie Woidtke, Do Boards Pay Attention When
Institutional Investors "Just Vote No "?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 84 (2008); Partnoy & Thomas, supra
note 71, at 10.
320. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 878.
321. In fact, Bebchuk's study, pinpointing directors' willingness to ignore nonbinding
shareholder resolutions, demonstrates that shareholders' ability to indirectly influence managers
is significantly undermined when managers perceive that there are no genuine repercussions for
their actions.
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strides in their efforts to increase their power, and these strides should not be
deemphasized simply because they do not encompass proxy access. In fact, each of the
new initiatives could have important effects on shareholder power independently.
Collectively, those effects will be enhanced. In addition, while recent initiatives may be
flawed, some of those flaws may be subject to cure. More importantly, these initiatives
have actually been enacted. By contrast, proxy access has not fared well in the past
and, given the historical and current level of resistance to such access, may not fare
well in the future. From this perspective, continuing to devote significant resources and
efforts on proxy access may not be the best strategy for shareholder activists. Instead,
the best strategy may be to focus on eliminating the flaws associated with recent
initiatives, and thus shoring up the gains that have been made.
However, this Article contends that while other mechanisms should not be ignored
or diminished in their importance, focusing on proxy access should remain a priority.
Indeed, despite the recent defeat of such access, at least some members of the SEC
have indicated a willingness to revisit the issue. 322 In light of this indication, proxy
access may still represent an achievable goal. Moreover, activists should continue to
press for such access while the issue is still on the SEC's agenda or activists risk losing
whatever momentum they now possess. Finally, as this Article reveals, proxy access
does have significant advantages over other empowerment mechanisms, and hence it is
important that activists do not abandon the quest for access in order to focus on
admittedly less appealing measures.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, shareholder activists have experienced many successes in their
campaign to enhance shareholder power. They have convinced a majority of
corporations to adopt a majority vote standard, which ensures that only directors who
receive majority support will be elected. Shareholders also have convinced many
corporations to abolish staggered boards, ensuring that directors will be up for election
every year. Then, too, the SEC has enacted rules that enable shareholders to solicit
proxies via the Internet. Such rules are designed to reduce the cost of waging proxy
contests, and hence increase shareholders' ability to put forth candidates of their
choice. Finally, the SEC has adopted rules aimed at facilitating electronic shareholder
forums. These rules augment shareholders' ability to communicate not only with other
shareholders, but also with corporate directors and officers. All of these initiatives
increase shareholders' voting power, and thus reflect the success of the recent
shareholder democracy campaign.
Yet shareholders have yet to secure proxy access. In fact, currently only corporate
managers can nominate candidates of their choice on the corporations' proxy
statement; shareholders cannot. After considering whether to grant shareholders proxy
access twice within the last five years, the SEC to date has failed to do so.
This failure seems to be a significant defeat for the proxy access campaign. Indeed,
shareholder activists have long considered proxy access to be the cornerstone of any
effective shareholders' rights movement because such access affords shareholders the
ability to nominate candidates of their choice on the corporation's ballot. Such
322. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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nomination right not only eliminates the cost associated with proxy solicitation
campaigns, but also enables shareholders to take advantage of any potential
psychological advantage gained by having a nominee on the corporation's ballot. By
denying shareholders such right, the SEC's rejection of proxy access appears to
undermine the shareholders' rights effort.
To be sure, some contend that such a view places too much emphasis on proxy
access, while failing to appreciate the value of recent successes. While this Article
reveals that these other successes are significant and hence produce value to the
shareholders' rights effort, this Article also maintains that they are not viable
substitutes for proxy access. Such access is simply a stronger, and thus more
meaningful, right than these other initiatives. Thus, while we should not diminish the
importance of the many advances that have been made to date, shareholder activists
should continue advocating for proxy access. Indeed, while the battle for such access
has been, and will no doubt continue to be, a difficult one, it appears well worth the
effort, because it is not clear that shareholders can lose the battle for proxy access and
still claim victory in their larger shareholder democracy campaign.
